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Sirius

Posts: 1,723 Member Since:03/13/04

#61 [url]

Apr 19 06 10:29 PM

BAJO LA LUPA
Alfredo Jalife-Rahme

Los riesgos de un bombardeo nuclear a Irán

TEHERAN. SI LA GUERRA de Irak y el empantanamiento subsecuente de la dupla anglosajona de Estados Unidos y Gran Bretaña marcó el fin de la efímera era unipolar, así como el extravío del unilateralismo bushiano, la crisis iraní constituye la primera grave sacudida del incipiente orden multipolar.

LA TENSION ES intensa entre Moscú y Teherán. En forma sorprendente, Vladimir Yevseyev, prominente investigador del Centro para la Seguridad Global, con sede en Moscú, aseguró que el anuncio del ingreso de Irán al club nuclear constituía un bluff, un mero acto exhibicionista de "relaciones públicas" para "presionar a Occidente y obtener una mejor posición negociadora" (Novosti, 12/04/ 06). Irán se encontraría todavía lejos de una "producción de combustible nuclear a plena escala". El "ciclo completo incluye la separación de plutonio, además del enriquecimiento de uranio, y el país solamente ha comenzado los pasos iniciales en esta esfera", lo cual le "tomaría por lo menos tres años para acumular el suficiente porcentaje de uranio enriquecido y crear una bomba atómica". Alegó que Irán "no podía ser considerado miembro del club nuclear por no haber realizado una prueba atómica".

HAN EMPEZADO A aparecer en los multimedia de Estados Unidos advertencias a los más altos niveles del pensamiento estratégico sobre los riesgos de un ataque a Irán como exige el desplumado cuan desprestigiado grupo neoconservador sediento de sangre.

ANTHONY ZINNI, GENERAL retirado y ex jefe del Comando Central del Pentágono, en una asombrosa entrevista a CNN advirtió los riesgos de una nueva aventura militar. Zinni destacó por sus visionarios señalamientos contra la guerra en Irak, que ha desembocado en una revuelta de un grupo de sobresalientes generales en contra de Donald Rumsfeld, un civil fantasioso a cargo del Pentágono. David Ignatius, quien apoyó el unilateralismo bushiano en Irak, desde su columna bisemanal en The Washington Post (14/04/06), considera que más de 75 por ciento del ejército de Estados Unidos desea la renuncia y/o el cese de Rumsfeld, quien ha perdido su legitimidad pese al apoyo desorbitado de Baby Bush.

ZINNI SOPESA LAS graves consecuencias de un bombardeo unilateral: desde el entrampamiento del ejército de Estados Unidos en Irak -donde puede ser objeto del fuego cruzado de los sunitas y los chiítas, que le infligiría severas bajas por la retaguardia-, pasando por el alza del petróleo, hasta ataques contra Israel y la intensificación de una guerra generalizada de guerrillas.

PEPE ESCOBAR, CONNOTADO analista de Asia Times (13/04/06), pondera la presencia de técnicos rusos en las plantas nucleares de Bushehr y Natanz, que complica la dimensión de la "crisis multipolar" en caso de un bombardeo que pudiera forzar la intervención rusa: "Irán no será fácilmente intimidada. Pocos en Irán toman en serio la amenaza de las sanciones petroleras".

KENNETH POLLACK, INVESTIGADOR de la Brookings Institution, uno de los centros de pensamiento menos sesgados de Estados Unidos, proclama que la respuesta iraní a los bombardeos sería "furiosa": los 130 mil soldados de Estados Unidos estacionados en Irak sufrirían las consecuencias de los embates. Colocó en la picota las fantasías destructivas de las plantas nucleares.

JOSEPH CIRINCIONE, DIRECTOR del Proyecto de No Proliferación, del Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, aseveró que los bombardeos consolidarían el control del gobierno en lugar de debilitarlo.

RICHARD HAASS, PRESIDENTE del influyente Consejo de Relaciones Exteriores, con sede en Nueva York, expuso los riesgos en un artículo en The Financial Times (15/04/06). Elimina la posibilidad de un bombardeo limitado que, al contrario, provocaría un conflicto "ilimitado, muy costoso e impredecible", ya que Irán no se quedaría con los brazos cruzados porque emprenderá severas represalias: "el costo de un bombardeo preventivo (sic) superaría sustancialmente (sic) los probables beneficios". Tiene en mente los recientes juegos de guerra que desplegó el ejército iraní en el estrecho de Ormuz y en el golfo de Omán: "El precio del petróleo treparía (sic) por encima de 100 dólares el barril. Irán podría empujar el precio aún más alto si redujera sus exportaciones petroleras y/o si tomase una acción para interrumpir el flujo regional de petróleo". La consecuencia de la "cascada de eventos" desembocaría en una "recesión global".

AMEN DE QUE un bombardeo nuclear "no eliminaría el know-how -el conocimiento tecnológico-... en lugar de reducir, contribuiría a la amenaza proliferativa. Socavaría el tabú contra el uso de armas nucleares -que ha durado más de 60 años- y solamente acrecentaría los maleficios de que otros obtengan o usen armas nucleares para promover sus objetivos". Se inclina por la vigencia de un régimen de vigilancia mundial similar al Tratado de No Proliferación.

VISLUMBRA EN FORMA lúcida que un "ataque de Estados Unidos alimentaría el antiamericanismo en Europa y reforzaría las manos de quienes en Rusia y China claman por una revisión de sus lazos con Estados Unidos y su papel en el mundo". Se desprende que Estados Unidos, muy mermado por su aventura unilateral en Irak, quedaría como el gran paria universal, además de averiado y más aislado del concierto de las naciones civilizadas, lo que en suma equivaldría a un suicidio. En esta fase de transición del efímero orden unipolar al incipiente orden multipolar, el uso de las armas, ya no se diga las nucleares, denota grandes limitaciones.

RICHARD HAASS PROCURA la búsqueda de una "alternativa diplomática que lleve a negociaciones directas con Irán", más allá de la estrechez del diálogo que han iniciado sobre el contencioso iraquí. Tal posibilidad la exploramos con algunos estrategas iraníes, quienes nos manifestaron su disponibilidad para negociar en forma directa, a sabiendas de los altos costos posturales y populares en que incurrirían, y que serían mayores para Irán que para Estados Unidos.

PROPONE EL MARCO referencial de las negociaciones: a cambio de "beneficios económicos, garantías de seguridad y diálogo político" se le permitiría a Irán un "simbólico (sic) programa de enriquecimiento de uranio a lo mucho (sic); uno que sea demasiado pequeño para producir una cantidad militarmente significativa en la próxima década (sic), acoplado con las más invasivas (sic) inspecciones".

EL PROBLEMA CON la desfasada y desincronizada propuesta de Richard Haass, muy similar a la rusa, es que ya fue superada por la irrupción tecnológica del enriquecimiento de uranio en Natanz, que obliga a un reajuste realista del marco negociador.

EN CASO DE un rechazo a la propuesta de Richard Haass, la ONU aplicaría dolorosas "sanciones económicas en los sectores petroleros y gaseros de Irán", y tampoco oculta que Estados Unidos busca una coartada de legitimización internacional, al unísono de las fuerzas moderadas en el interior del gobierno iraní, para elevar la puja en caso de un rechazo que no deja suelta la opción militar "preventiva" en última instancia.

QUEDA CLARO QUE al día de hoy el "bombardeo preventivo" carece de legitimidad internacional, por lo que el frente de batalla se ha trasladado al campo de la opinión pública internacional, donde los iraníes tendrán que ser sumamente precavidos para no brindar coartadas indeseables.

EN NUESTRO DIALOGO con estrategas y funcionarios iraníes nos llamó la atención que no vislumbren la inminencia de un bombardeo estadunidense, que exhibiría más bien un clásico juego de "guerra sicológica" para mejorar su posición a la hora de negociar. Es interesante percatarse de que los rusos aduzcan que el enriquecimiento de uranio en Natanz consista en un bluff, así como los persas consideren que Estados Unidos está bluffeando ya que un operativo militar en la coyuntura presente de la otrora superpotencia unipolar (v.g. serios problemas domésticos y externos) comporta mayores desventajas que beneficios.

MIENTRAS CHINA SE mantiene en una vigilante distancia precavida y la Unión Europa cede su carta para que Estados Unidos la juegue en su lugar, en medio del despliegue de la hermenéutica geopolítica resaltan las apuestas de tres grandes actores, uno de los cuales está bluffeando: Estados Unidos, Rusia y, desde luego, el involucrado, Irán. Dos de ellos acabarán por ponerse de acuerdo contra un tercero y alguien va a sufrir una pérdida muy elevada. Hasta ahora, todo indica que no será Irán, a menos que cometa un error incalculable.

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Sirius

Posts: 1,723 Member Since:03/13/04

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Apr 19 06 11:30 PM

Hipotetic WW III : CHINA VS. THE USA.
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

If it comes to a shooting war ...

By Victor N Corpus

Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have their say. Please click here if you are interested in contributing.

One could call this article a worst-case scenario for the new American century. Why worst case? Because of the hard lessons from history. The Romans did not consider the worst-case scenario when Hannibal crossed the Alps with his elephants and routed them; or when Hannibal encircled and annihilated the numerically superior Roman army at the Battle of Cannae.


The French did not consider the worst-case scenario at Dien Bien Phu and when they built the Maginot Line, and the French suffered disastrous defeats.

The Americans did not consider the worst-case scenario at Pearl Harbor or on September 11, and the results were disastrous for the American people. Again, American planners did not consider the worst-case scenario in its latest war in Iraq, but instead operated on the "best-case scenario", such as considering the Iraq invasion a "cake walk" and that the Iraqi people would be parading in the streets, throwing flowers and welcoming American soldiers as "liberators", only to discover the opposite.

Scenario One: America launches 'preventive war' vs China

Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union and Southwest Asia.
–Paul Wolfowitz, former US deputy secretary of defense and currently president of the World Bank
Consider these snapshots of China:

Since 1978, China has averaged 9.4% annual GDP growth

It had a five-fold increase in total output per capita from 1982 to 2002

It had $61 billion in foreign direct investment in 2004 alone and foreign trade of $851 billion, the third-largest in the world

The US trade deficit with China exceeded $200 billion in 2005

China has $750 billion in foreign exchange reserves and is the second-biggest oil importer

Last year it turned out 442,000 new engineers a year; with 48,000 graduates with master's degrees and 8,000 PhDs annually; compared to only 60,000 new engineers a year in the US.

China for the first time (2004) surpassed America to export the most technology wares around the world. China enjoyed a $34 billion trade surplus with the US in advanced technology products in 2004 (The Economist, December 17, 2005). In 2005, the surplus increased to $36 billion

It created 20,000 new manufacturing facilities a year

It holds $252 billion in US Treasury Bonds (plus $48 billion held by Hong Kong)

Among the five basic food, energy and industrial commodities –grain and meat, oil and coal and steel –consumption in China has eclipsed that of the US in all but oil.

China has also gone ahead of the US in the consumption of TV sets, refrigerators and mobile phones

In 1996, China had 7 million cell phones and the US had 44 million. Now China has more mobile phone users than the US has people.

China has about $1 trillion in personal savings and a savings rate of close to 50%; U.S. has about $158 billion in personal savings and a savings rate of about 2% (The Wall Street Journal, Nov 19, 2005)

Shanghai boasts 4,000 skyscrapers – double the number in New York City (The Wall Street Journal, Nov 19, 2005)

Songbei, Harbin City in north China is building a city as big as New York City

Goldman Sachs predicts that China will surpass the US economy by 2041.

Before China's economy catches up with America, and before China builds a military machine that can challenge American superpower status and world dominance, America's top strategic planners (Project for the New American Century) decide to launch a "preventive war" against China. As a pretext for this, the US instigates Taiwan to declare independence.


Taiwan declares independence!

China has anticipated and long prepared itself for this event. After observing "Operation Summer Pulse –04" when US aircraft carrier battle groups converged in the waters off China's coast in mid-July through August of 2004, Chinese planners began preparing to face its own worst-case scenario: the possibility of confronting a total of 15 carrier battle groups composed of 12 from America and three from its close British ally. China's strategists refer to its counter-strategy to defeat 15 or more aircraft carrier battle groups as the "assassin's mace" or shashaujian.

After proper coordination with Russia and Iran and activating their previously agreed strategic plan, troops and weapon systems are pre-positioned. China then launches a missile barrage on Taiwan. Command and control nodes, military bases, logistics centers, vital war industries, government centers and air defense installations are simultaneously hit with short and medium range ballistic missiles armed with conventional, anti-radar, thermo baric and electro-magnetic pulse warheads.

At the North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) Command and Control Center, ranking defense officials watch huge electronic monitor screens showing seven US and two British aircraft carrier battle groups converging on the East China Sea with another three US carrier battle groups entering the Persian Gulf, while the remaining two US and one British battle groups remain in the Indian Ocean to serve as a strategic reserve.

As the aircraft carrier battle groups advance, China draws out one of its "trump cards" by leaking to the world media that it is dumping its holdings of US Treasury bonds and shifting to gold and euros.

Meanwhile, strategic planners at NORAD watch with glee as they observe on the screen as monitored by their radar satellites that Chinese surface ships are making a hasty retreat as nine allied carrier battle groups advance toward the Philippine Sea and Chinese waters near Taiwan.


The assassin's mace: China's anti-satellite weapons


Glee and ecstasy soon turn to shock as monitor screens suddenly go blank. Then all communication via satellites goes dead. China has drawn its second "trump card" (the assassin's mace) by activating its maneuverable "parasite" micro-satellites that have unknowingly clung to vital (NORAD) radar and communication satellites and have either jammed, blinded or physically destroyed their hosts.

This is complemented by space mines that maneuver near adversary satellites and explode. Secret Chinese and Russian ground-based anti-satellite laser weapons also blind or bring down US and British satellites used for C4ISR (command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance). And to ensure redundancy and make sure that the adversary C4ISR system is completely "blinded" even temporarily, hundreds of select Chinese and Russian information warriors (hackers) specifically trained to attack their adversary's C4ISR systems simultaneously launch their cyber offensive.

For a few precious minutes, the US and UK advancing carrier battle groups are stunned and blinded by the "mace", ie, a defensive weapon used to temporarily blind a stronger opponent. But the word mace has another meaning; one which is deadlier and used in combination with the first.

A mace can be a spiked war club used in olden times to knock out an opponent. Applied in modern times, the spikes of the assassin's mace refer to currently unstoppable supersonic cruise missiles capable of sinking aircraft carriers that are in China's inventory; complemented by equally unstoppable "squall" or SHKVAL rocket torpedoes and regular 65 cm-diameter wake-homing torpedoes, bottom-rising rocket-propelled mines, and "obsolete" warplanes converted into unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) firing anti-ship missiles from standoff positions and finally dive-bombing into the heart of the US and UK aircraft carrier armada.

Missile barrage on advancing carrier battle groups
A few seconds after the "blackout", literally hundreds of short and medium-range ballistic missiles (DF7/9/11/15s, DF4s, DF21X/As, some of which are maneuverable) pre-positioned on the Chinese mainland, and stealthy, sea-skimming and highly-accurate cruise missiles (YJ12s, YJ22s, KH31A/Ps, YJ83s, C301s, C802s, SS-N-22s, SS-NX-26/27s, 3M54s & HN3s) delivered from platforms on land, sea and air race toward their respective designated targets at supersonic speed.

Aircraft carriers are allotted a barrage of more than two dozen cruise missiles each, followed by a barrage of short and medium-range ballistic missiles timed to arrive in rapid succession.

Supersonic cruise missiles constitute China's third deadly "trump card" against the US – part of the so-called assassin's mace. These unstoppable cruise missiles may be armed with 440-lb to 750-lb conventional warheads (or 200-kiloton tactical nuclear warheads 10 times stronger than Hiroshima) traveling at more than twice the speed of sound (or faster than a rifle bullet).

The cruise missiles, together with the SRBMs and MRBMs (short and medium-range ballistic missiles) may also be armed with radio frequency weapons that can simulate the electro-magnetic pulse of nuclear explosions to fry computer chips, or fuel-air explosives that can annihilate the personnel in aircraft carriers and battleships without destroying the platforms.

Their effective range varies from less than 100 to 1,800 kilometers from stand-off positions. Delivered by long-range fighter-bombers and submarines, their range can be extended even further. In fact, stealthy Chinese and Russian submarines can deliver such nuclear payloads to the US mainland itself.

No US defense vs supersonic cruise missiles
The US and UK aircraft carrier battle groups do not have any known defense against the new supersonic missiles of their adversaries. The Phalanx and Aegis ship defense systems may be effective against subsonic cruise missiles like the Exocets or Tomahawks, or exo-atmospheric ballistic missiles, but they are inadequate against the sea-skimming and supersonic Granits, Moskits and Yakhonts or similar types (Shipwreck, Sunburn and Onyx - North Atlantic Treaty Organization codenames) of modern anti-ship missiles in China's inventory.

Not only China and Russia have these modern cruise missiles, so do Iran, India and North Korea. These missiles can be delivered by SU-27 variants, SU-30s, Tu22M Blackjacks, Bears, J6s, JH-7/As, H-6Hs, J-10s, surface ships, diesel submarines or common trucks.

Adding to the problems facing aircraft carriers are the SHKVAL or "squall" rocket torpedoes installed in some Chinese and Russian submarines and surface ships. At 6,000 lbs apiece, these torpedoes travel at 200 knots (or 230 miles per hour) with a range of 7,500 yards guided by autopilot. They are designed to sink aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines. Again, it is unfortunate for the US and UK to have no known or existing defenses against this new generation of rocket torpedoes.


China's sea mines

Complicating matters for the US aircraft carrier battle groups are the hundreds of hard-to-detect, rocket-propelled, bottom-rising sea mines that are anchored and hidden on the sea bottom covering pre-selected battle sites in the East China Sea and the Philippine Sea designed to home in on submarines and surface ships, particularly aircraft carriers.

These sophisticated sea mines (EM-52s) have been deployed by Chinese and Russian submarines before the missile attack on Taiwan in anticipation of the major event that is to follow.

Finally, in addition to all these asymmetric weapons, the US and UK aircraft carrier battle groups will have to contend with the thousands of "obsolete" Chinese fighter planes converted into unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) launching missiles at stand-off positions and finally diving kamikaze-style into the heart of the carrier battle groups.

Chinese and Russian submarines fire their inventory of anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and "squall" rocket torpedoes at the aircraft carriers and submarines of the US and UK as the carrier battle groups come within range. As the battle progresses, the Chinese and Russian submarines maneuver to the rear of the carrier battle groups to complete the encirclement.

In less than an hour after launching the saturation barrage of missiles on the US and UK naval armada, all the aircraft carriers and their escorts of cruisers, battleships and several of the accompanying submarines are in flames, sinking or sunk, turning the East China Sea and the Philippine Sea into a modern-day "Battle of Cannae".

Meanwhile, the Chinese fleet that conducted a strategic retreat forms a phalanx along the forward positions off China's coast, ready to augment the hundreds or thousands of land-based long-range surface-to-air missiles of China (SA-10s, SA-15s and SA-20s) with their own short, medium and long-range air defense missile systems.

Applying its long-held military doctrine of "active defense", China also launches simultaneous missile attacks on the forces-in-being and logistics-in-place of the US and its allies in Japan, South Korea, Guam, Okinawa, Diego Garcia and Kyrgyzstan, hitting these US bases with missiles armed with radio frequency weapons, fuel-air explosives and conventional warheads. As another Chinese military doctrine states: "Win victory with one strike."


Chinese and Russian missiles cocked

Both Chinese and Russian inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and the two countries' extensive air defense systems have been coordinated and ready to respond in the event that the US and UK decide to retaliate with a nuclear attack.

In addition, Ranets-E and Rosa-E radio frequency/electro-magnetic pulse systems scattered all along China's coastal cities are on the look-out to neutralize incoming missiles and aircraft that may respond after the attack on the aircraft carrier battle groups. These systems can work in tandem with airborne-based anti-missile laser systems now in China's inventory.


China's trump cards vs the US

China's deadly "trump cards" (ie, the huge holdings of US Treasury bonds, the anti-satellite weapons system, the supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles, SRBMs, MRBMs, "squall" rocket torpedoes, sea mines, UCAVs, DF31A and DF41 road-mobile ICBMs, JL2 SLBMs, air defense system, IO/EW/IW, and other RMA weapons) are the key ingredients of the assassin's mace.

China may not possess any of those expensive aircraft carriers of the superpower, but it can wipe out those carrier battle groups with a "single blow" of its assassin's mace or shashaujian –its major tool for conducting asymmetric warfare to defeat the US in a major confrontation over the Taiwan issue or other issues.

The US may possess the most powerful war machine in the world, but it can be defeated by an inferior force by avoiding the superpower's strength and exploiting its weaknesses. Again, an integral part of Chinese doctrine is: "Victory through inferiority over superiority." One famous Chinese strategist, Chang Mengxiong, compared asymmetric warfare to "a Chinese boxer with a keen knowledge of vital body points who can bring a stronger opponent to his knees with a minimum of movement".

The sad part for the American people, particularly the innocent sailors who will be manning the battle groups, is that even if US planners come to realize that the aircraft carrier battle groups (which are the mainstay of the US Navy and the main instrument of US power projection worldwide), have been rendered vulnerable or obsolete by China's assassin's mace.

The US cannot simply change strategy or discard such a weapons system. To change strategy or "retool" would mean wasting hundreds of billions of dollars invested in those highly sophisticated systems. The strong lobbying of influential defense contractors making those systems would make change extremely difficult.

For defense authorities to admit the strategic blunder constitutes an almost insurmountable barrier to a change of strategy. And finally, the loss of hundreds of thousands of jobs related to those systems may be politically and economically unbearable for any US administration to bear should the program for the aircraft carrier battle groups be scrapped. Because of these factors, America may be stuck with an obsolete system that is too expensive to maintain but will only lose the war for the US when employed in a major conflict.


Meanwhile, on the Middle East Front...

On another major front, on previously coordinated signals with China and Russia, Iran lets loose its own barrage of supersonic Granit, Moskit, Brahmos and Yakhont cruise missiles carried by trucks or hidden in man-made tunnels all along the mountainous shoreline of Iran fronting the Persian Gulf.

The three US aircraft carrier groups that entered the Persian Gulf to ensure the unhindered flow of Arab oil are likely to be helpless "sitting ducks" against the bottom-rising sea mines and low-flying, supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles in Iranian hands. In the process, a couple of oil tankers about to exit the Strait of Hormuz are hit with the aid of rocket-propelled sea mines, thus effectively blockading the narrow strait and stopping oil supplies from coming out of the Middle East.

A "weak" nation like China or Iran, without a single aircraft carrier in their respective navies, could thus obliterate the carrier battle groups of a superpower. Here, one can see the hidden and often unnoticed power of asymmetric warfare, which may well spell the end of "gunboat diplomacy" in the not so distant future.


The Central Asian front...

On yet another major front in Central Asia, Russian troops lead the other member-countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) into a major offensive against US military bases in Central Asia.

The bases are first subjected to a simultaneous barrage of missiles with fuel-air explosives and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) warheads before they are overrun and occupied by SCO coalition forces. The missile attack on the US bases is followed by a lightning attack by four mechanized armored divisions coming from the Yili Korgas pass of China's Xinjiang province, linking up with Russia's own armored divisions in a pincer offensive against US forces in Central Asia and the Middle East.


America crippled on three major fronts

In just a few hours (or days) after the outbreak of general hostilities, America, the world's lone superpower, finds itself badly crippled militarily in three major regions of the world: East Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East.

Impossible? Unfortunately, the answer is no. China now has the know-how and the financial resources to mass-produce hundreds, if not thousands, of Moskit, Yakhont and Granit-type supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles and "squall"-type rocket torpedoes against which US and UK aircraft carriers and submarines have no known defense.

Iran, on the other hand, already possesses the same supersonic cruise missiles that can destroy any ship in the Persia Gulf, including aircraft carriers. Russia and China, meanwhile, are operating on familiar grounds close to their territory, compared to the US, which needs to cross the Atlantic and Pacific to replenish troops and logistics.


A geopolitical reality America has to face

An important consideration in any US-China conflict is the geopolitical reality that the US and its allies will be operating on exterior lines, while China will operate on interior lines. This gives China a huge advantage in a major war in Asia against US and allied forces.

Consider the long sea lanes of communication (10,000 kilometers) that the US alliance would be forced to cross each time its forces had to resupply and you get an idea of the huge logistics problem that the US would face in a confrontation with China.

Such lengthy sea lanes of communication (SLOC) are highly vulnerable to a gauntlet of Chinese and Russian submarines lying in ambush along the route laden with underwater sea mines. This will make transporting personnel and equipment by the US over the Pacific or the Atlantic extremely dangerous and expensive.

Compare this US handicap with troop movement by Chinese troops using heavy-lift aircraft, railways and highways within the China mainland. China's interior lines of communication are shorter and protected, with little chance for enemy interdiction. Chinese troops can concentrate numerically superior forces rapidly at any given point to defeat invading US forces one by one with much shorter and less vulnerable lines of communication.

And in the event that the US forces and their allies are lucky enough to land on the Chinese mainland, they will be faced not only with a conventional People's Liberation Army of more than 2 million, but also with a people's militia conducting asymmetric warfare and a people's war in its teeming millions. US forces and their allies will be like a raging bull charging and goring a hive of killer bees. US forces may be able to set foot in China, but it is highly doubtful if they could come out alive.



Grimmer scenarios

There is a scenario grimmer than described above, however, and that is if strategic planners belonging to that elite group called the Project for the New American Century decide to launch a nuclear "first strike" against China and Russia and risk a mutually-assured destruction: 1)In defense of Taiwan ... or 2) In launching a "preventive war" to stop China from catching up economically and militarily. Or, if China decides to start an offensive against Taiwan with a one-megaton nuclear burst 40 kilometers above the center of the island. Or, if China and Russia decide to arm a number of their short and medium-range ballistic missiles and supersonic cruise missiles with tactical nuclear warheads in defending themselves against US and UK aircraft carrier battle groups.

Land-attack versions of these supersonic cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads carried by stealthy Chinese and Russian submarines can also put American coastal cities at great risk to nuclear devastation. Strategic planners must also consider these worst-case possibilities.

Scenario two: America vs a medium power
"In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, our overall objective is to remain the predominant outside power in the region and preserve US and Western access to the region's oil." - Paul Wolfowitz

"I cannot think of a time when we have had a region emerge as suddenly to become as strategically significant as the Caspian. But the oil and gas there is worthless until it is moved. The only route which makes both political and economic sense is through Afghanistan." – Dick Cheney in 1998 as chief executive of a major oil services company

History is replete with vivid examples where a much stronger and larger force has been defeated by a weaker and smaller force. The French were defeated by Vietminh guerrillas in Dien Bien Phu. Soviet Union forces, still a superpower at that time, were defeated in Afghanistan. And another superpower, the United States, was defeated by "ill-clad, ill-fed and ill-armed" Vietcong guerrillas in Vietnam.


Asymmetric warfare

If the US pushes through its plan of world domination, then it should expect all the smaller and weaker countries that do not wish to be pushed around to fight back using asymmetric warfare. This is a form of warfare that allows the weak to fight and defeat a much stronger foe by "attacking the enemy's weakness while avoiding his strengths".

The US, for instance, may possess the most sophisticated weapons system on Earth. It may have the most modern planes, helicopters, ships, guns, precision-guided weapons, sophisticated sensors and command and control systems, but if it cannot see its adversary, if it is fighting a shadowy and "invisible" enemy (like American and British forces are experiencing in Iraq), such advanced and sophisticated weapons systems are rendered useless.

In asymmetric warfare, most of the fighting is conducted at the team level. Thousands of agile and elusive teams consisting of two to five members equipped with man-portable surface-to-air missiles, portable anti-tank guided weapons, sniper rifles, man-portable mortars, anti-tank mines, anti-personnel mines, sea mines, C4 explosives (for making car bombs, booby-traps and improvised explosive devices or IEDs) riding on bicycles and motorcycles and fast boats will make the lives of any invading or occupying forces extremely miserable.

These "invisible" agile teams merge with the population most of the time and come out only when there is a vulnerable target to strike at. Then, they disappear into the shadows. They communicate via runners bringing coded written messages, so there are no electronic signals to track down. They operate semi-autonomously, so there are no centers of gravity that can be targeted.

And since they are indigenous to the area and united with the local people, their human intelligence (humint) is far more superior to that of the invaders. They will also enjoy a tremendous advantage in psychological operations (psyops), for it is much easier to mobilize nationalist sentiments against a foreign occupier than for an aggressor to justify occupation.

Asymmetric warfare may be compared to a fierce lion invading the territory of a school of piranhas; or a king cobra encroaching into a colony of fire ants. The lion may be the king of beasts, mighty and strong, but it is no match against the tiny piranhas in their own territory. The sharp fangs and claws of the lion are rendered useless. The same is true with the cobra's venom. The analogy applies to the French in Dien Bien Phu, the Soviets in Afghanistan and the Americans in Vietnam and now in Iraq.


Asynchronous warfare

Aside from asymmetric warfare, weak nations fighting the strong can also avail themselves of asynchronous warfare. If a strong nation invades or occupies a weak one, the weak bides its time before striking back. And it strikes at a time and place when and where the adversary least expects.

An example is Iraq. The underground resistance movement in Iraq may recruit Iraqi scientists or sympathetic scientists of other nationalities to infiltrate the US (via the Mexican border, for instance) and manufacture dirty bombs as well as chemical and biological weapons inside the US. Such weapons may be brought to Washington and detonated in or near the US Congress.

They could also hire a private plane, or buy one themselves, and use it to spread biological or chemical weapons they have manufactured in-country over New York or Washington. They can mail letters containing anthrax to key offices of vital services all over the US and paralyze utilities and other government functions nationwide.

Or they can smuggle, say, the components of a hundred portable surface-to-air missiles, assemble them in the US, and employ them simultaneously in all of the major airports in America. Or they can employ those portable surface-to-air missiles to simultaneously target American airlines taking off or landing in different international airports all over the world.

Some major powers may pass on their research on RMA (revolution in military affairs) to the Iraqi resistance to be tested inside the US. These weapons include laser weapons, ultrahigh frequency weapons, ultrasonic wave weapons, stealth weapons, high-powered microwave weapons and electromagnetic guns. They include miniature robot ants that infiltrate computers, stay dormant and then activate on the signal to destroy their hosts. The Iraqi underground could also recruit hackers to work inside and/or outside the US to hack into key US systems.


American crossroad

As the sole superpower, the US stands at a critical crossroad. One road leads to world domination. Using its pre-eminent military war machine without equal, it can strike at any perceived threat, change foreign sovereign regimes at will, grab precious mineral resources anywhere in the world and control local economies with its host of transnational corporations. It can also sabotage the economy of up-coming rivals, or launch preventive wars to preempt prospective competitors and try to defeat them militarily while they are still weak compared to America.

Such a course of action is very tempting, especially to leaders with global ambitions of becoming "Lords of the Earth". But such a road is full of risks and what is planned on paper, as what was done in Iraq, may not turn out as hoped. And such a path will necessarily ignite the outrage of most right-thinking people. America will earn for itself the enmity and hatred of people all over the world.

America had outlined its blueprint for world domination, by force if necessary, in the following documents:

National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2001

President George W Bush's speech at the Graduation Ceremony at West Point, June 1, 2002

Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for the New Century, a report of the Project for the New American Century, September 2000

Defense Planning Guidance written by then deputy defense secretary Paul Wolfowitz in February 18, 1992

In these documents, the US outlined some of its new doctrines and policies, such as: preventive war, pre-emptive military action, unilateralism, regime change, acting as the world's constabulary or "cavalry", establishment of military bases and spreading US forces all over the world, control of outer space and the global commons of cyberspace and control of the world's oil resources.

The alternate road, on the other hand, leads to world leadership. The US can choose to use its power, wealth and influence to sincerely do good for the people on this planet. It can lead in easing or obliterating the debt burden of poor nations, or in promoting the spread of quality education through distance learning in remote villages of developing countries.

It can focus in the fight against poverty, or the fight against drugs, or the effort to save the deteriorating environment of planet earth. It can lead the fight against HIV/AIDS, or malaria and other deadly diseases. The whole world is waiting for the US to lead in these important battles.

If the US chooses to focus its huge resources on the latter, I am confident that it will gain the hearts and minds of people all over the world. Then it can be a true world leader. Then it can maintain its preeminent world status. By gaining the world's sympathy and support, terrorism directed against Americans and the US mainland will be greatly minimized. The alternate road, in fact, is the key to defeating the phenomenon of "terrorism" gripping the world today.

Victor N Corpus is a retired brigadier general. He has a master's degree in public administration from the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. His major assignment while serving in the armed forces of the Philippines was as chief of the intelligence service.

Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have their say. Please click here if you are interested in contributing.

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Sirius

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#63 [url]

Apr 19 06 11:48 PM

20:19 | 19/ 04/ 2006

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MOSCOW, April 19 (RIA Novosti) - The chief of the General Staff said Wednesday that Russia would honor its commitments on supplying military equipment to Iran.

"We discussed supplies of military equipment to Iran, including the Tor M1, in the framework of bilateral cooperation, but it does not fall into the category of strategic weapons," Army General Yury Baluyevsky said after talks in Moscow with NATO Supreme Allied Commander in Europe General James Jones.

"And I can assure you it will be delivered under the control of the relevant organizations," he said.

At the end of 2005, Russia concluded a $700-million contract on the delivery of 29 Tor M1 air defense systems to Iran.

The Tor-M1 is a fifth-generation integrated mobile air defense system designed for operation at medium, low and very low altitudes against fixed/rotary wing aircraft, UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicle), guided missiles and other high-precision weapons.

Despite strong criticism from the United States, Russia has maintained that the systems could be used only to protect Iran's air space.

Baluyevsky also said Russia's Armed Forces would not be involved in any military conflict in Iran.

"I do not think the conflict [in Iran] will turn into a war," he said. "Russia will not propose the use of its armed forces in a potential military conflict on either side."

Baluyevsky said he did not discuss the Iranian nuclear program with Jones, although the issue is "on everybody's mind."

Meanwhile, Iran's Defense Minister, Mostafa Mohammad-Najar, said Wednesday that his country would go ahead with its non-military nuclear research because it was a legitimate right of the Iranian people.

The Iranian official is currently on a three-day visit to the neighboring Central Asian republic of Azerbaijan to discuss bilateral cooperation in the defense sphere.

Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, will attend a summit of Economic Cooperation Organization, a regional cooperation body, in the capital of Azerbaijan, Baku, on May 4-5.

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Sirius

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#65 [url]

Apr 22 06 9:53 AM

Los rusos tienen su propia "Stealth" Technology.

+++++++++++++++++++

Russian bombers flew undetected across Arctic - AF commander

13:40 | 22/ 04/ 2006

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MOSCOW, April 22 (RIA Novosti) - Russian military planes flew undetected through the U.S. zone of the Arctic Ocean to Canada during recent military exercises, a senior Air Force commander said Saturday.

The commander of the country's long-range strategic bombers, Lieutenant General Igor Khvorov, said the U.S. Air Force is now investigating why its military was unable to detect the Russian bombers.

"They were unable to detect the planes either with radars or visually," he said.

Khorov said that during the military exercises in April, Tu-160 Blackjack bombers and Tu-95 Bears had successfully carried out four missile launches. Bombing exercises were held using Tu-22 Blinders.

By the end of the year, two more Tu-160s will be commissioned for the long-range strategic bomber fleet, Khorov said.

Both new planes will incorporate numerous upgrades from the initial Soviet models, the commander said. The bombers will be able to launch both cruise missiles and aviation bombs, and communicate via satellite.

http://en.rian.ru/russia/20060422/46792049.html


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Russian bombers launch cruise missiles during
exercises in Far North


11:45 | 22/ 03/ 2006

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MOSCOW, March 22 (RIA Novosti) - Russian strategic bombers practiced cruise-missile launches during combined-force tactical exercises that ended Wednesday, an Air Force spokesman said.

Colonel Alexander Drobyshevsky said the four-day exercises, involving 15 Tu-95MC [NATO codename Bear] strategic bombers, 12 Il-78 tanker planes, and Su-27 fighters, had been supervised by Lieutenant General Igor Khvorov, Commander of the Strategic Air Command's 37th Army.

A total of eight cruise missiles were launched during the exercises, which also included day- and night-time midair refueling and flights in the Far North, Drobyshevsky said, adding that 60% of the crews were novice pilots.

A Tu-95 bomber can carry up to six X-55 cruise missiles capable of hitting stationary targets with high precision.

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#68 [url]

Apr 22 06 8:07 PM

NO POR MUCHO MADRUGAR AMANECE MAS TEMPRANO NO POR MUCHO MADRUGAR AMANECE MAS TEMPRANO NO POR MUCHO MADRUGAR AMANECE MAS TEMPRANO NO POR MUCHO MADRUGAR AMANECE MAS TEMPRANO NO POR MUCHO MADRUGAR AMANECE MAS TEMPRANO NO POR MUCHO MADRUGAR AMANECE MAS TEMPRANO NO POR MUCHO MADRUGAR AMANECE MAS TEMPRANO NO POR MUCHO MADRUGAR AMANECE MAS TEMPRANO NO POR MUCHO MADRUGAR AMANECE MAS TEMPRANO NO POR MUCHO MADRUGAR AMANECE MAS TEMPRANO NO POR MUCHO MADRUGAR AMANECE MAS TEMPRANO NO POR MUCHO MADRUGAR AMANECE MAS TEMPRANO

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Sirius

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#69 [url]

Apr 23 06 9:48 AM

China, Russia welcome Iran into the fold

By M K Bhadrakumar

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which maintained it had no plans for expansion, is now changing course. Mongolia, Iran, India and Pakistan, which previously had observer status, will become full members. SCO's decision to welcome Iran into its fold constitutes a political statement. Conceivably, SCO would now proceed to adopt a common position on the Iran nuclear issue at its summit meeting June 15.

Speaking in Beijing as recently as January 16, the organization's secretary general Zhang Deguang had been quoted by Xinhua news agency as saying: "Absorbing new member states needs a legal basis, yet the SCO has no rules concerning the issue. Therefore, there is no need for some Western countries to worry whether India, Iran or other countries would become new members."

The SCO, an Intergovernmental organization whose working languages are Chinese and Russian, was founded in Shanghai on June 15, 2001 by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The SCO's change of heart appears set to involve the organization in Iran's nuclear battle and other ongoing regional issues with the United States.

Visiting Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mohammadi told Itar-TASS in Moscow that the membership expansion "could make the world more fair". And he spoke of building an Iran-Russia "gas-and-oil arc" by coordinating their activities as energy producing countries. Mohammadi also touched on Iran's intention to raise the issue of his country's nuclear program and its expectations of securing SCO support.

The timing of the SCO decision appears to be significant. By the end of April the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency is expected to report to the United Nations Security Council in New York regarding Iran's compliance with the IAEA resolutions and the Security Council's presidential statement, which stresses the importance of Iran "reestablishing full, sustained suspension of uranium-enrichment activities".

The SCO membership is therefore a lifeline for Iran in political and economic terms. The SCO is not a military bloc but is nonetheless a security organization committed to countering terrorism, religious extremism and separatism. SCO membership would debunk the US propaganda about Iran being part of an "axis of evil".

The SCO secretary general's statement on expansion coincided with several Chinese and Russian commentaries last week voicing disquiet about the US attempts to impose UN sanctions against Iran. Comparison has been drawn with the Iraq War when the US seized on sanctions as a pretext for invading Iraq.

A People's Daily commentary on April 13 read: "The real intention behind the US fueling the Iran issue is to prompt the UN to impose sanctions against Iran, and to pave the way for a regime change in that country. The US's global strategy and its Iran policy emanate out of its decision to use various means, including military means, to change the Iranian regime. This is the US's set target and is at the root of the Iran nuclear issue."

The commentary suggested Washington seeks a regime change in Iran with a view to establishing American hegemony in the Middle East. Gennady Yefstafiyev, a former general in Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service, wrote: "The US's long term goals in Iran are obvious: to engineer the downfall of the current regime; to establish control over Iran's oil and gas; and to use its territory as the shortest route for the transportation of hydrocarbons under US control from the regions of Central Asia and the Caspian Sea bypassing Russia and China. This is not to mention Iran's intrinsic military and strategic significance."

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said: "I would not be in a hurry to draw conclusions, because passions are too often being whipped up around Iran's nuclear program ... I would also advise not to whip up passions."

Sergei Kiriyenko, head of Russia's nuclear power agency and a former prime minister, said Iran was simply not capable of enriching uranium on an industrial scale. "It has long since been known that Iran has a 'cascade' of only 164 centrifuges, and obtaining low-grade uranium from this 'cascade' was only a matter of time. This did not come as a surprise to us."

Yevgeniy Velikhov, president of Kurchatov Institute, Russia's nuclear research center, told Tier-TASS, "Launching experimental equipment of this type is something any university can do."

By virtue of SCO membership, Iran can partake of the various SCO projects, which in turn means access to technology, increased investment and trade, infrastructure development such as banking, communication, etc. It would also have implications for global energy security.

The SCO was expected to set up a working group of experts ahead of the summit in June with a view to evolving a common "energy strategy" and jointly undertaking pipeline projects, oil exploration and related activities.

A third aspect of the SCO decision to expand its membership involves regional integration processes. Sensing that the SCO was gaining traction, Washington had sought observer status at its summit meeting last June, but was turned down. This rebuff - along with SCO's timeline for a reduced American military presence in Central Asia, the specter of deepening Russia-China cooperation and the setbacks to US diplomacy in Central Asia as a whole - prompted a policy review in Washington.

Following a Central Asian tour in October by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Washington's new regional policy began surfacing. The re-organization of the US State Department's South Asia Bureau (created in August 1992) to include the Central Asian states, projection of US diplomacy in terms of "Greater Central Asia" and the push for observer status with the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) should be seen in perspective.

US diplomacy is working toward getting Central Asian states to orientate toward South Asia - weaning them away from Russia and China. (Hamid Karzai's government in Kabul has also failed to respond to SCO's overtures but has instead sought full membership in SAARC.)

But US diplomacy is not making appreciable progress in Central Asia. Washington pins hopes on Astana (Kazakhstan) being its pivotal partner in Central Asia. The US seeks an expansion of its physical control over Kazakhstan's oil reserves and formalization of Kazakh oil transportation via Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, apart from carving out a US role in Caspian Sea security.

But Kazakhstan is playing hard to get. President Nurusultan Nazarbayev's visit to Moscow on April 3 reaffirmed his continued dependence on Russian oil pipelines.

Meanwhile, Washington's relations with Tashkent (Uzbekistan) remain in a state of deep chill. The US attempt to "isolate" President Islam Karimov is not working. (Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is visiting Tashkent on April 25.) Again, Tajikistan relies heavily on Russia's support. In Kyrgyzstan, despite covert US attempts to create dissensions within the regime, President Burmanbek Bakiyev's alliance with Prime Minister Felix Kulov (which enjoys Russia's backing) is holding.

The Central Asians have also displayed a lack of interest in the idea of "Greater Central Asia". This became apparent during the conference sponsored by Washington recently in Kabul focusing on the theme.

The SCO's enlargement move, in this regional context, would frustrate the entire US strategy. Ironically, the SCO would be expanding into South Asia and the Gulf region, while "bypassing" Afghanistan.

This at a time when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is stepping up its presence in Afghanistan. (General James L Jones, supreme allied commander Europe, said recently that NATO would assume control of Afghanistan by August.)

So far NATO has ignored SCO. But NATO contingents in Afghanistan would shortly be "surrounded" by SCO member countries. NATO would face a dilemma.

If it recognizes that SCO has a habitation and a name (in Central Asia, South Asia and the Gulf), then, what about NATO's claim as the sole viable global security arbiter in the 21st century? NATO would then be hard-pressed to explain the raison d'etre of its expansion into the territories of the former Soviet Union.

M K Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service for more than 29 years, with postings including India's ambassador to Uzbekistan (1995-1998) and to Turkey (1998-2001).

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Sirius

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#70 [url]

Apr 23 06 10:00 AM

BAJO LA LUPA
Alfredo Jalife-Rahme

Misterioso visitante iraní en EU

ALREDEDOR DEL 6 DE ABRIL arribó a Washington Mohammad Nahavandian, consejero de asuntos económicos y tecnológicos de Ali Larijani, jefe del Consejo Supremo de Seguridad Nacional (SNSC, por sus siglas en inglés) y principal negociador del contencioso nuclear iraní. Mohammad Nahavandian permanecerá en Washington por tiempo ilimitado.

MIENTRAS LOS neoconservadores straussianos y la dupla Cheney-Rumsfeld profundizan su declive humillante, el Departamento de Estado, a cargo de Condoleezza Rice, el nuevo poder tras el trono, evitó pronunciarse sobre la visita misteriosa del negociador iraní a la capital de Estados Unidos, mientras su portavoz, Sean McCormack, alegó en forma kafkiana que Estados Unidos no había otorgado visa al visitante misterioso, quien no había establecido contacto con ningún personaje del gobierno bushiano.

EN FORMA CARACTERISTICA de su legendaria hermenéutica geopolítica, el gobierno iraní negó que Mohammad Nahavandian se encuentre negociando en Washington alguno de los dos contenciosos: la retirada de Irak del ejército de Estados Unidos y/o el enriquecimiento de uranio iraní (Stratfor, 19/04/06).

HAY QUE RECONOCER que Stratfor, centro de pensamiento israelí-texano vinculado a la plutocracia petrolera anglosajona, hace tiempo había enunciado la comunicación tras bambalinas entre estadunidenses e iraníes para diseñar el reparto del pastel iraquí que ha puesto en ascuas a los países árabes.

ALI AKBAR Hashemi Rafsanjani, anterior presidente y uno de los prelados más influyentes de la teocracia chiíta, en una entrevista en Kuwait (sitio que parece haberse convertido en su centro de información) confirmó la visita del viajero misterioso, Mohammad Nahavandian (quien funge también como presidente de la importante Cámara de Comercio e Industria), dizque "invitado por académicos" de Estados Unidos para asistir a una conferencia, además de saludar a su hijo, que estudia en una universidad de esa nación. Sabrá Dios dónde habrá tenido lugar tal conferencia poco común, pero el viejo zorro Rafsanjani no desperdició la oportunidad para colocar una sustanciosa dosis de veneno que dejó mal parado al Departamento de Estado, que no supo explicar cómo había entrado Nahavandian a Estados Unidos sin visa: "escuché (sic) reportes que había celebrado charlas oficiales (sic) en Washington, pero Irán (¡super-sic!) había negado tales reportes" (AFP, 19/04/06). Sin comentarios.

EL PROBLEMA CON las versiones alambicadas sobre el periplo del viajero misterioso iraní Mohammad Nahavandian es que hace 25 años que no suceden este tipo de visitas a Estados Unidos, con o sin visa.

FREE REPUBLIC (19/04/06) comenta que "Estados Unidos fue exhibido en una situación embarazosa con la revelación de la visita oficial de un funcionario iraní". No podía faltar la perfidia británica y The Financial Times cita sin tapujos a un "consejero iraní" que no identifica (el viejo truco), quien supuestamente develó que la visita de Mohammad Nahavandian a Washington fue para "discutir la posibilidad de entablar amplias (sic) negociaciones directas entre los dos países, que no han tenido relaciones diplomáticas por un cuarto de siglo". El rotativo británico concluye que "Estados Unidos autorizó a su embajador en Bagdad, Zalmay Khalilzad, a tener discusiones directas con los iraníes sobre la situación en el vecino Irak".

STRATFOR ADUCE QUE la aparición de Mohammad Nahavandian en Estados Unidos "probablemente sea una visita preparatoria, que abre el paso para negociaciones muy complejas y de mayor significado". En forma lúcida encomia las negociaciones: "considerando que Estados Unidos tiene pocos medios viables para someter a Irán", mientras Rusia y China no aprueban las sanciones y cuando los "bombardeos militares no contribuyen necesariamente en los más amplios intereses de Estados Unidos".

STRATFOR DESTACA LA coyuntura internacional de la visita: la apertura de negociaciones públicas entre Estados Unidos e Irán sobre el futuro de Irak, que se han demorado, y la escalada retórica entre Washington y Teherán sobre el proyecto nuclear iraní; menciona que, aunque el gobierno bushiano y la teocracia iraní han insistido en el "límite estricto" de las negociaciones sobre el contenciosos iraquí, "existen señales (sic) de que su enfoque pudiera ser ampliado al tema nuclear". En apoyo a sus asertos, coloca en relieve el llamado del muy influyente republicano Richard Lugar, presidente del Comité de Relaciones Exteriores del Senado, para que Estados Unidos negocie en forma directa con Irán. En forma significativa, Alemania se ha pronunciado por las negociaciones directas entre ambos países, sobre lo cual se han manifestado tanto la canciller Angela Merkel en sus charlas con Bush, como el ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, en sus tratativas con Stephen Hadley, asesor de seguridad nacional y hombre de todas las confianzas de Condi Rice.

EL MISMO DIA del arribo del viajero misterioso Mohammad Nahavandian, The New York Times (06/04/06) le abrió su hospitalidad editorial a Javad Zarif, representante iraní ante la ONU, quien abogó por negociar el programa nuclear iraní, en clara alusión al gobierno bushiano, cuando Irán ha mantenido negociaciones con la troika europea (Gran Bretaña, Francia y Alemania), Rusia y China, a las que faltaría incorporar a Estados Unidos.

LOS IRANIES NO dejan nada al azar y han conformado una delegación de cinco miembros al más alto nivel para negociar con los funcionarios de Estados Unidos sobre Irak, que será encabezada por Alí Hussein-Tash, el vicedirector del SNSC. Los otros cuatro delegados son también miembros del consejo y entre ellos destaca un especialista en asuntos kurdos (¡ojo!).

EL SIEMPRE OPORTUNO y veraz Wayne Madsen Report (20/04/06) devela que la "semana pasada una delegación iraní de alto nivel pudo haberse reunido con funcionarios del gobierno bushiano en el Aspen Institute del Centro de Conferencias en Wye River (Maryland) para negociar el programa nuclear iraní y otros asuntos de interés mutuo". Los negociadores iraníes ingresaron en secreto a Estados Unidos hasta que alguien dio el pitazo (por cierto, gradualmente controlado). La delegación incluye "funcionarios del programa nuclear iraní y líderes (sic) cercanos al presidente Mahmoud Ahmadinejad y al supremo líder, el ayatola Ali Jamenei", entre quienes se encuentra el visitante misterioso Mohammad Nahavandian, cuya presencia significó una situación embarazosa para Estados Unidos, que había desatado su furibunda cuan falsa retórica bélica.

QUIZA A SABIENDAS de las negociaciones tras bambalinas en Maryland, hasta ahora nos percatamos de la razón por la cual en Irán los funcionarios y los estrategas con quienes dialogamos no tomaban en serio la belicosidad unilateral del gobierno bushiano, que catalogan como pura "guerra sicológica".

DURANTE NUESTRA BREVE visita a Irán percibimos la disposición de Teherán a entablar negociaciones directas con Washington (ver Bajo la Lupa, 16 y 19 de abril). En varios comentarios que hemos externado en radio y televisión sobre nuestra visita nada misteriosa a Irán, referimos que la preocupación iraní en estos momentos, de cara a su compromiso el 11 de junio contra México en el mundial de futbol, se centraba en si alineaba Cuauhtémoc Blanco, a quien temen más que a las amenazas de Baby Bush de bombardear con armas nucleares a la antigua Persia. Los iraníes recuperaron la paz mental cuando les avisamos que Cuauhtémoc Blanco había sido extirpado de la lista del entrenador Antonio La Volpe.

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EL PERIODICO RUSO Pravda (19/04/06) arguye que "Irán usa su programa nuclear para manipular a Estados Unidos y a la economía global", y que "pese a las declaraciones bélicas del presidente Bush, no es probable que Estados Unidos ataque a Irán en el corto plazo (sic). El liderazgo iraní está perfectamente consciente de ello. Mahmud Ahmadinejad no es ninguna persona loca y percibe que Estados Unidos no desea desatar otra guerra en el Medio Oriente. Las bravatas iraníes exhiben, por consecuencia, una influencia negativa en la imagen (sic) política de Estados Unidos, la cual pudiera ser descrita como otra guerra fría, en la que Irán ha salido vencedor hasta ahora. Lo que sí es verdad es que este conflicto puede desembocar eventualmente en un crisis económica global".

POR LO PRONTO, el precio del petróleo alcanzó 75 dólares el barril y ha jalado en su surco al gas y al otro binomio del oro y la plata. Tampoco pasó inadvertido que el presidente iraní Ahmadinejad adujera que todavía no alcanzaba su verdadero precio (no especificó cuál es), mientras el megaespeculador Schwartz György (alias George Soros) aseguraba que el precio del crudo rebasaría los 250 dólares por barril.

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Sirius

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#71 [url]

Apr 23 06 10:12 AM

"VALLE DE LOBOS" Y
"TORMENTA DE ACERO"


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Jean Meyer
23 de abril de 2006

Rambo turco

Desde luego se vale que alguien hagauna película como El valle de los lobos (Kurtlar Vadisien en turco). Es la producción más cara de la historia del cine turco y está arrasando en las taquillas de Turquía, de los países europeos a donde ha llegado, y ahora en los países árabes.

Es la historia del agente Polat Alemdar, el Rambo turco, quien venga tanto el orgullo nacional humillado por Estados Unidos, como el de la inocente población civil iraquí, víctima de las bestias pardas gringas. La película de Serdar Akar empieza con un hecho histórico, la captura de 11 soldados turcos por los estadounidenses, el 4 de julio de 2003, unas semanas después de la caída de Bagdad, en el norte de Irak. Se los llevaron a Bagdad, los interrogaron antes de liberarlos pero eso provocó una seria crisis diplomática entre Ankara y Washington.

Para lavar la afrenta, Polat Alemdar, héroe de la muy popular telenovela El valle de los lobos, entra en guerra contra esos estadounidenses que irrumpen en una boda pacífica para transformarla en horrible baño de sangre. Es cuando empieza la cruzada, la guerra santa de nuestro Rambo que persi-gue al comandante Marshall (Billy Zane, el de Titanic). El amigo que vio la película en París, en una sala llena de inmigrantes turcos y ma-grebís, me dice que es una espectacular superproducción digna de Hollywood, algo como el mejor Rambo en Afganistán. Aho-ra los gringos están en el papel de los soviéticos, tan torpes como malvados, autores de masacres y siempre ridiculizados por el héroe; se vengan tumbando el mina-rete de una mezquita. Como si eso no fuese suficiente, un médico estadounidense (y judío, "elemental, mi querido Watson") se enriquece con el tráfico de órganos que saca a los presos de la famosa cárcel de Abu Ghraib, la de las torturas e humillaciones ejercidas contra los presos iraquíes desnudos y amordazados.Esos elementos reales históricos sirven para exaltar el nacionalismo turco y alimentar el antiamericanismo muy fuerte en Turquía desde marzo de 2003, desde la invasión de Irak por las fuerzas de EU. Será una "película antiestadounidense y racista" como lo ha señalado el partido demócrata-cristiano alemán, al pedir su prohibición en Alemania, de todos modos hay que verla y el gobierno alemán hizo bien en dejarla circular. En Turquía es ya la película más vista en la historia del país y el presidente del Congreso, entusiasmado, declaró que "es una película extraordinaria que va a pasar a la historia". La esposa del primer ministro Erdogan asistió a la premier y dijo que tanto a ella como a su marido, les "encantaba". Hoy circula con éxito en varios países de Europa y empieza su carrera fulminante en 12 países árabes. Acusaron al ex presidente Calles, a la hora de su expulsión del país, de ser nazi porque llevaba a la mano el libro Mi lucha de un tal Adolf Hitler. Calles, como los verdaderos y escasos políticos lúcidos, sabía que lo que pasaba en Alemania era importante. Por eso leía Mein kampf. Hoy hay que ver esa película, como habría que leer el mayor éxito de librería 2005 en Turquía Tormenta de acero (título robado a Ernst Jünger).¿La película y la novela cultivan de ma-nera irresponsable el odio y la desconfianza contra Occidente, y no sólo contra Estados Unidos? ¿No facilitan la integración de los 20 millones de musulmanes que viven en Europa? ¿Quién sabe? De todos modos hay que informarse, si uno piensa que 400 mil de los 2 millones de turcos que viven en Alemania ya vieron la película y que la opinión general, entre ellos, es que la pelícu-la "trata hechos reales, de una forma cruda pero verídica y presenta la verdadera cara de los estadounidenses". El guionista Bahadir Ozdener asegura que la película es pacifis-ta, que va contra la guerra en general y se limita a mostrar la realidad de la viola-ción de los derechos humanos por un ejército invasor y ocupante.La novela Metal firtina (Tormenta de acero) escrita a cuatro manos por el periodista Burak Turna y el autor de ciencia-ficción Orkun Ucar, ha sido el best-seller del año pasado y sigue rompiendo récords de venta en Turquía: va en la 12ª edición y dicen que es muy leída en los cuarteles del ejército. Cuenta la historia de una guerra entre Turquía y Estados Unidos en la cual el pequeño David acaba con el monstruoso Goliat. México está presente a través de su mafia de narcos que trafican con armas. Ahí les va el cuento: en 2007, EU invade a Turquía y en dos semanas acaban la conquista, a partir de sus bases en el vecino Irak. Su operación llamada "Tormenta de acero" repite la invasión (Freedom) de Irak en 2003, con el éxito militar inicial, el saqueo y vandalismo, con la ulterior imposibilidad de controlar el país. Intentan dividir el país en la fase 2 llamada "Operación Sévres" (nombre del tratado inaplicado después de la Primera Guerra Mundial que repartía al imperio otomano), entre armenios, griegos y kurdos. Fracasan porque los turcos se alían con China, Rusia y Alemania y porque el agente secreto Gokan surge como otro Rambo: Washington desaparece en el apocalipsis nuclear, Turquía ha triunfado.Lo importante no es la historia que cuenta la novela, que enseña la película, sino lo que significa la recepción entusiasta que han recibido esos dos productos culturales y políticos. Se meten con la actualidad inmediata, con el presente, los actores se llaman Putin, Bush, Condoleezza Rice; se denuncia a los "cruzados" que sueñan con construir una megacatedral en Estambul; sus discusiones sobre armamento, logística, estrategia, fascinan a cualquier experto en asuntos militares. ¿Cómo no fascinarían a los oficiales turcos? Y el antiamericanismo, ampliado a antioccidentalismo, ¿cómo no fascinaría a las masas? La guerra de Irak ha despertado profundas pasiones negativas. Un ejemplo: corrió la voz en Turquía de que el tsunami de Navidad 2004 no era natural, sino provocado por una explosión nuclear de EU...jean.meyer@cide.eduProfesor investigador del CIDE

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Sirius

Posts: 1,723 Member Since:03/13/04

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Apr 26 06 5:43 PM

THE ROVING EYE
What's really happening in Tehran
By Pepe Escobar

QUOTE
"Tehran appears hell-bent on defying the international community and pursuing a nuclear program that is of growing concern."

- Sean McCormack, US State Department spokesman. This followed a rare press conference with the international media in Tehran on Monday in which Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad suggested that Tehran might withdraw from the United Nations nuclear watchdog agency and the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and also said "there is no need" for US-Iranian talks on Iraq.



Because of the opacity of Iran's theocratic nationalism, outsiders may be tempted to assume that the official Iranian position is the
one expressed last week in Baku, Azerbaijan, by Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najar: "The United States has been threatening Iran for 27 years, and this is not new for us. Therefore, we are never afraid of US threats."

President George W Bush and other US administration officials have frequently said that "all options are on the table" with regard to Iran's nuclear program, which the United States suspects is designed to develop nuclear weapons.

Last month, the United Nations Security Council passed a statement asking Atomic Energy Agency head Mohamed ElBaradei to report simultaneously to the council and the IAEA board by April 28 on whether Iran had halted enriching uranium, a process that can produce fuel for nuclear warheads. To date, Tehran has refused to do so.

Javad Zarif, the Iranian ambassador to the UN, has repeatedly relayed the official position. Iran's nuclear program is peaceful; there is no proof of a military development; the religious leadership opposes atomic weapons; and Iran has not invaded or attacked any nation for the past 250 years.

The power spheres in Iran seem to bet that even in the event of a shock and awe of B-2s, missiles and bunker busters, that simply is not enough to snuff out accumulated Iranian nuclear know-how and the quest to master the nuclear fuel cycle. So the only real question would be for how many years the US would be able to slow down Iran's nuclear program.

Is that all there is? Not really.

As some Iranian analysts and ministry officials have told Asia Times Online in Tehran off the record, there are reasons to believe the leadership is misreading an avalanche of US signs related to the military and psychological preparation for a possible war.

For instance, fundamentalist Christians in the US - who support Zionism for theological reasons - unleashed a ferocious media campaign depicting Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad as the Antichrist who wants to destroy Jerusalem and prevent Jesus' comeback.

There are even indications that the Iranian leadership has not taken the Bush administration's explicit desire for regime change seriously. It's as if the leadership is persuading itself Washington would never dare to escalate the situation - especially after such US bodies as the Union of Concerned Scientists and the National Academy of Sciences have stated that a tactical nuclear strike could kill more than a million Iranians.

At Monday's press conference, Ahmadinejad, asked about possible military strikes, smiled broadly and dismissed the notion. "Military attacks? On what pretext?" he asked, adding that Iran was strong and could defend itself.

Earlier, Iranian Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar said any US military attack over Iran's nuclear program would result in a humiliating defeat for the United States, the official Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) reported.

But what if the Bush administration and the Ahmadinejad presidency were bluffing each other into a nuclear war?

Pick your faction
The key question is which Iranian leadership will have the final say. There are at least four main factions in the complex Iranian game of power politics.

The first faction is a sort of extreme right, closely aligned from the beginning to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and involved with a rapprochement with Sunni Arabs in general, while opposing even a tactical rapprochement with the US.

The faction includes the dreaded hojjatieh (a semi-clandestine, radically anti-Sunni organization) and the Iranian Hezbollah, which supports both the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Arab nationalism of Muqtada al-Sadr in Iraq. Former defense minister Ali Chamkhani - whom Asia Times Online was told in Tehran could not talk to the foreign press - is very close to this faction. They are very conservative religiously and socialist economically.

The difference between the Iranian and the Lebanese Hezbollah is that in Beirut Hezbollah is much more active, pushing to be at the heart of political life and improving people's living conditions.

The role of Ahmadinejad - a former Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran) middle-rank official - in molding this first faction has been crucial. In 2005, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had the support of former president and Machiavellian master of ambiguity, Hashemi Rafsanjani, at the highest levels of power - the Expediency Council.

But as a balancing act the supreme leader also decided to boost the profile of Ahmadinejad, who happened to be totally opposed to the pragmatist Rafsanjani. To add more arabesques to this Persian miniature, Khamenei's favorite candidate in the 2005 presidential elections was actually Baqer Qalibaf, a former chief of police - basically a conservative but in favor of a controlled opening of political life, the supreme leader's own policy.

What this all means is that Ahmadinejad - even winning against Rafsanjani and Qalibaf - and as the new leader of the extreme right is not really in charge of the government. It's an open secret in Tehran that the Pasdaran intervened in the elections through massive fraud. This has led in the past few months to the formation of an anti-Ahmadinejad coalition that ranges from Qalibaf supporters to - believe it or not - pro-secular intellectuals close to former president Mohammad Khatami.

The supreme leader knew that Ahmadinejad would revive the regime with his populist rhetoric, very appealing to the downtrodden masses. But the ruling ayatollahs may have miscalculated that since they control everything - the Supreme National Security Council, the Guardians Council, the foundations, the army, the media - they could also control the "street cleaner of the people". That was not the case, so now plan B - restraining the president, and the powerful Pasdaran - is in order.

The second key faction is composed of provincial clerics, whose master is the supreme leader himself. These are pure conservatives, attached to the purity of the Islamic Revolution of 1979, and more patriotic than the first faction. They are not interested in more integration with Sunni Arabs. Faithful to the supreme leader, they want to keep both progressives and extremists "in the same house" (Ahl al Bait) , with the velayat-e-faqih - the role of jurisprudence - as the supreme law of the land. Ever since the 2004 parliamentary elections - largely boycotted by the Iranian population - an association of clerics totally dominates the majlis (parliament).

But there are huge problems behind this appearance of unity. Iranian money from the bonyads - foundations - badly wants a reconciliation with the West. They know that the relentless flight of both capital and brains - which is being actively encouraged by the Rafsanjani faction - is against the national interest. But they also know this can hurt Ahmadinejad's power. Some Western-connected Iranians are even comparing Ahmadinejad's current days to the Gang of Four in China a little while before the death of Mao Zedong in 1976.

The Pasdaran for their part want to keep their fight against Zionism and go all the way with the nuclear program. This entails the extraordinary possibility of a US attack against Iranian nuclear sites counting on the complicity of a great deal of the mullahcracy - which does not hide its desire to get rid of Ahmadinejad and his Pasdaran "gang".

All going the Machiavellian's way?
The third faction is the left - initially former partisans of the son of ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Ahmad Khomeini, who died in mysterious circumstances in the 1990s. After that they operated a spectacular mutation from Soviet-style socialism into some sort of religious democracy, which found its icon in former president Khatami of "dialogue of civilizations" fame. They became the so-called progressives - and even if they lost the 2004 and 2005 elections, they are still a force, although already debilitated by the slow awakening of a younger, more secular and more radical opposition.

The fourth and most unpredictable faction is Rafsanjani's. The consummate Machiavellian masterfully retained his own power from the late 1990s, juggling between Khamenei and Khatami. He may be the ultimate centrist, but Rafsanjani is and will always remain a supporter of the supreme leader. What he dearly wants is to restore Iran's national might and regional power, and reconcile the country with the West, for one essential reason: he knows an anti-Islamic tempest is already brewing among the youth in Iran's big cities.

As head of the Expediency Council, fully supported by the supreme leader, and in his quest to "save" the Islamic Revolution, Rafsanjani retains the best possible positioning.

Meanwhile, Ahmadinejad holds as much power as his predecessor - the urbane, enlightened and sartorially impeccable Khatami: that is, not much. What Ahmadinejad's obvious excesses are doing is to solidify the support the Rafsanjani faction is getting from the intelligentsia as well as the urban youth, not to mention the "enlightened police" faction of Qalibaf. This does not mean that another revolution is around the corner - as the Bush administration's wishful thinking goes.

Apart from these four factions, there are two others that are outside the ironclad circle of supreme-leader power: the revolutionary left and the secular right. Clerics call them biganeh (eccentric), and the denomination may be correct to a point, as both these groups are mostly disconnected from the majority of the population, although they also support the nuclear program out of patriotism.

The extreme left hates the mullahcracy, but has also derided Khatami's moderately progressive agenda. As for the Westernized liberals - which include former supporters of deposed prime minister Mohammad Mossadegh and members of the Freedom Movement of Iran, an opposition party, they are becoming increasingly popular with Tehran students, who are more and more pro-American (if not in foreign policy at least in behavior and cultural preferences).

The regime may in essence be unpopular - because of so much austerity and the virtual absence of social mobility - but for millions it is still bearable. No one seems to be dreaming of revolution in Iran. What is actually happening is the slow emergence of a common front - bent on the restoration of the power of the Iranian state through an alliance with Shi'ism in Iraq, Bahrain and Lebanon.

This may be interpreted as a Shi'ite crescent by alarmist Sunni Arabs, but there's no military, expansionist logic behind it. The common front is also in favor of moving toward a more market economy and a progressive liberalization of morals and public opinion. This is what one hears in Tehran from young people, women, workers in the cultural industry, and philosophers - and it is Tehran that always sets the agenda in Iran.

If the regime does not open up, the Iranian economy will never create enough jobs over the next few years to fight unemployment among its overwhelmingly young population. A great deal of the non-oil-dependent private sector is controlled by the bonyads, whose managers are usually incompetent and corrupt clerics.

Many Iranians know that an economic crisis - high oil prices notwithstanding - will rip the heart out of the lower middle class, the regime's base, and more crucially the industrial working class, which used to be aligned with the Tudeh, Iran's communist party.

There is a way out
They key to solving most of Iran's problems lies in finding a compromise with the West - especially the Americans - regarding the nuclear dossier. For all his vocal, popular support in the provinces, if Ahmadinejad and his Pasdaran hardliners go against this national desire for stability and progress, they will be sidelined.

Demonizing Western parallels of Iran enriching a few grams of uranium as akin to Adolf Hitler's march into the Rhineland is positively silly. So far Iran has only disregarded a non-binding request from the UN Security Council. The uranium-enrichment program may be under the operational control of the Pasdaran, but Ahmadinejad does not set Iran's nuclear policy: the supreme leader does, his guidelines followed by the Supreme National Security Council, which is led by the leader's protege, Ali Larijani. Khamenei and Larijani have both substantially toned down the rhetoric; Ahmadinejad hasn't.

The point is not that Ahmadinejad is a suicidal nut bent on confronting the US by all means available. The point is that the president leads just one of four key factions in a do-or-die power play, and he is following his own agenda, which is not necessarily the Iranian theocratic leadership's agenda. Washington neo-conservatives for their part may want regime change - but that won't happen with another shock and awe.

Ahmadinejad is playing the typical Bonapartist - using a political deadlock to go all the way toward dictatorship. Rafsanjani may also be a Bonapartist, but the difference is he's not interested in dictatorship.

The ideal outcome of this whole "nuclear crisis" would be an Iran moving to a moderately liberal alliance between eternal pragmatist Rafsanjani - the only one capable of subduing the Pasdaran - and the semi-secular left, which still regards Khatami as the least bad of all possible models. It may not be paradise, but it certainly beats war.

(Copyright 2006 Asia Times Online Ltd.

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Sirius

Posts: 1,723 Member Since:03/13/04

#73 [url]

May 24 06 9:34 PM

¡Hoy es miercoles... hoy me toca!

Leer a Jalife...



Bajo la Lupa
Alfredo Jalife-Rahme

Las nuevas bolsas petroleras de Rusia e Irán

Si los depredadores consumidores parasitarios del petróleo, EU y Gran Bretaña, poseen sus bolsas energéticas, a fortiori, los países productores se han posicionado para imitarlos

Foto Reuters
Los estrategas de Rusia e Irán parecen haber asimilado en plenitud lo que los filósofos alemanes llaman zeitgeist (el "espíritu de la época"): la nueva era geopolítica de los energéticos.

Habría que definir antes el significado de la "derrota" anglosajona en su aventura unilateral en Irak: no haber podido capturar los yacimientos petroleros del país ilegalmente invadido. Pues bien, tal derrota desencadenó una serie de eventos geofinancieros, geoecónomicos y geoestratégicos de carácter estructural irreversible que se reflejan primordialmente en el fin del dolarcentrismo, lo cual ha despertado las veleidades libertarias tanto de una superpotencia de la talla de Rusia como de una potencia mediana del tamaño de Irán, para liberarse de los grilletes de la hegemonía del fenecido paradigma del petrodólar, mediante la creación de sus propias bolsas petroleras que competirán con el duopolio anglosajón del NYMEX y el IPE, con sedes en Nueva York y Londres respectivamente, y propiedad del binomio energético-bancario de las trasnacionales estadunidenses y británicas.

Si los depredadores consumidores parasitarios del petróleo, específicamente EU y Gran Bretaña, poseen sus bolsas energéticas, a fortiori, los países productores se han posicionado para imitarlos.

Una semana después a las bravatas provocativas que vertió Richard Bruce Dick Cheney en Vilnius (Lituania), a las puertas del Kremlin, el zar ruso Vladimir Putin replicó con el anuncio, durante su informe anual a la nación, que la divisa rusa, el rublo, sería transformada en una moneda "convertible" a nivel internacional a partir del 1º de julio, seis meses antes de lo programado (Novosti, 10/5/06).

Con el fin de promover la "convertibilidad" del rublo serán creadas las bolsas de valores rusas para comerciar su petróleo y gas, respectivamente la segunda y la primera reserva a escala planetaria.

Rusia participa con 15.2 por ciento en la exportación mundial de petróleo y con 25.8 por ciento del gas. Irán, pese a tener la segunda reserva gasera del mundo detrás de Rusia, todavía no entra de lleno a su comercialización, mientras exporta 5.8 por ciento del petróleo mundial, lo que le confiere un significado singular al lanzamiento bursátil ruso que golpeará en pleno rostro los intereses hegemónicos del duopolio anglosajón del NYMEX y el IPE.

Irán detenta una carta muy bien ocultada, mucho más peligrosa que el enriquecimiento de uranio y hasta su dotación con armas nucleares, con la que ha jugado espléndidamente: el lanzamiento de su bolsa petrolera en la isla de Kish, en pleno golfo Pérsico, y su comercialización en petroeuros en lugar de los devaluados petrodólares.

Las razones "técnicas" que se han esbozado sobre su atraso (se esperaba para el 20 de marzo, inicio del Nouruz, la primavera persa) tendrían más que ver, a nuestro humilde juicio, con las cerradas negociaciones tras bambalinas de la agenda múltiple entre el gobierno bushiano y la teocracia chiíta persa.

La isla Kish, zona especial de libre comercio, tiene una superficie de 91 kilómetros cuadrados, con los que Irán piensa rivalizar con Dubai, el centro financiero de los Emiratos Arabes Unidos bajo la férula anglosajona. Con solamente 20 mil habitantes, la isla recibe en forma increíble más de 1.5 millones de visitantes al año, que seguramente incrementarán su número con el lanzamiento bursátil que negociará contratos de petróleo, gas y petroquímicos cotizados en euros.

El consorcio bursátil de Kish, que incorporará preceptos islámicos, será conformado por la Bolsa de Valores de Teherán y el grupo Wimpole en el que figura nada menos que Cris Cook, anterior director de la bolsa petrolera británica IPE (Ver Bajo la Lupa, 15/2/06).

En forma curiosa, para no decir chistosa, Kazem Vaziri Hamaneh, ministro de petróleo iraní, anunció que debido a "fallas técnicas" (sic) el lanzamiento de la bolsa de Kish había sido pospuesto, sin fijar una fecha de su inauguración, para luego desdecirse, y volver a redesdecirse (Asia Times, 22/3/06 e Iranian WS, 26/4/06). Ahora resulta que es más sencillo enriquecer el uranio que lanzar una bolsa de valores. ¡Cómo los sofisticados iraníes, de corte multidimensional, han de traer mareados a los burdos negociadores estadunidenses, de corte unidimensional!

La columna Politcom del periódico ruso Pravda (14/5/06) refiere en forma caústica que Irán registró su bolsa petrolera el pasado 5 de mayo, que "será única en su género porque se desconocen las compañías que participarán, así como la fecha de su apertura".

Reconoce que si se permite a las trasnacionales petroleras negociar sus cotizaciones en euros en el piso de remates de la nueva bolsa iraní, entonces "el dólar corre el riesgo de perder su posición en el mundo petrolero". Comenta también que el precio del petróleo se encuentra muy bajo y continuará su alza, mientras el dólar seguirá su declive frente al euro como una tendencia general, con o sin Irán. Identifica que la devaluación del dólar brinda a EU mayor competitividad para vender sus bienes. Desecha la mutua influencia bidireccional entre EU e Irán, pero alerta de que un "error de cálculo de Irán podría llevar a la liquidación de sus aspiraciones atómicas". Viene una frase ominosa: "la creación de esta nueva bolsa petrolera y los juegos (sic) de Irán seguirán hasta que el Tío Sam decida poner su pie encima (sic), lo que llevará al fin de los juegos" (sic). No concede importancia económica a la apertura bursátil y considera que muchas decisiones de la teocracia chiíta son religiosas, además de políticas. Con o sin Irán, la dinámica alza de los precios del petróleo y el gas seguirán su trayecto que desembocará en una crisis que afectará a China, India, Europa y EU (en ese orden).

Durante su informe anual a la nación, Vladimir Putin anunció que la divisa rusa, el rublo, sería transformada en moneda "convertible" a nivel internacional a partir del 1º de julio, seis meses antes de lo programado Foto Ap
De dos cosas una: o los rusos están celosos de la competencia de la bolsa iraní, o se frotan las manos para que EU cometa el grave error estratégico y caiga en la trampa de bombardear Irán y así autocolocarse el último clavo en su propio féretro ante la comunidad internacional.

La desesperación energética de los impopulares gobiernos bushiano y blairiano, ambos en caída libre, es tan evidente que hasta perdonaron en forma poca elegante al sátrapa libio Muamar Khadafi de todos sus pecados "terroristas" con los que lo habían exorcizado durante casi cuatro décadas, con tal de obtener algunas gotas de hidrocarburos del Sahara. La intratable adicción al petróleo de la dupla anglosajona es de tal magnitud que hasta el periódico thatcheriano The Times (11/5/06) calificó al presidente Hugo Chávez como el "nuevo rey (¡súper sic!) de Latinoamérica".

En el próximo número de la revista Harper's aparecerán las notables investigaciones de Greg Palast, connotado periodista de la BBC (entrevista con Amy Goodman; "Democracy Now!", 15/5/06), sobre la "sacudida geopolítica" que estremecerá al mundo cuando se anuncie que Venezuela posee mayores reservas que Arabia Saudita, lo cual Bajo la Lupa había adelantado mucho tiempo atrás por simple cálculo aritmético al sumar su petróleo convencional con el no convencional (la variedad pesada del Orinoco).

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sibernako

Posts: 2,079 Member Since:03/04/04

#74 [url]

May 26 06 4:21 PM

Esto si es preocupante, leánlo por favor, es urgente!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!


QUOTE
The Missile Combat Crew on a desolate U.S. Air Force base are given orders to launch their missiles at the Soviet Union. The Missile Combat Crew Commander (portrayed by John Spencer), insists on calling out for verification while the Deputy (Michael Madsen) holds a gun to coerce him to follow orders. In the end, it appears that the MCCC fails to turn his launch key, meaning that the ten ICBMs under his command do not launch.

It is shortly revealed that the orders were part of a larger psychological test, designed to see how many U.S. Missile Combat Crew teams really would "turn the key" when given a launch order. Twenty-two percent of Missile Combat Crew teams failed to launch during the exercise.

At NORAD's Cheyenne Mountain headquarters, computer expert John McKittrick points out that a twenty-two percent is an unacceptably-high failure rate. McKittrick argues that a computer called WOPR[1] should be put into control of the silos, taking the men out of the loop. Over General Beringer's objections, the congressmen return to Washington and recommend the change-over. Congress approves, and the change is implemented; the launch terminals are converted, and electronic communications are established between each silo and NORAD headquarters in Colorado Springs.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Dialogue between David and WOPR

Response at NORAD to Soviet missile launches
Meanwhile, David Lightman (Broderick), a hacker, and resorting to cheating when his games obsession leads to poor marks in school, is excited by some new computer games, and doesn't want to wait for them to show up on store shelves. Equipped with a 1970s vintage IMSAI microcomputer and modem (connected to the telephone by an acoustic coupler, and with a host of other software not common among such early home computer users), he uses his smarts. He contacts Directory Assistance for the company's phone number, asks what other prefixes cover that location (there are five or six), and tells his computer to start dialing all 50,000 or 60,000 numbers in that area code, looking for modem tones, a practice known as war dialing. He intends to "fix" the call records so they don't show up on dad's phone bill.

When his class-mate Jennifer Mack comes by the house with him, David checks out the half-dozen modem numbers he's found so far. One's a bank, another's a travel agency, and he books a trip to Paris for Jennifer and himself, though it's unusable since it isn't paid for. He tries another number and it keeps hanging up on him when he tries to get a login prompt. David takes it to a computer nerd friend of his for advice, learning about "backdoors". He also investigates a Professor Stephen W. Falken (creator of the software in WOPR), and finds out more about him, including a deceased son named Joshua. David tries again, with Jennifer present, and this time the password "Joshua" gives him access into the unknown computer.

David, under the impression that he has hacked into a gaming software manufacturer's computer database and unaware of the machine's real purpose, discovers what he believes to be a simulation video game called "Global Thermonuclear War" and begins to "play", taking the side of the Soviet Union. Unbeknownst to him, WOPR sets in motion preparations for a real attack against the Soviet Union. At NORAD HQ, everyone leaps into action at a warning of incoming Soviet missiles. David and his girlfriend are having loads of fun aiming missiles at American cities, but when David's mother calls him downstairs, he shuts down his computer, and WOPR stops the simulation.

Later that day, David and Jennifer are shocked when the television news reports a brief alert at NORAD. He also finds that the computer, as the personality of "Joshua", is trying to phone back to connect with his computer. He's arrested coming out of a 7-Eleven, taken to NORAD and questioned. McKittrick asks David who he's going to Paris with (referencing the unused plane tickets). McKittrick begins to think David is an unwitting intruder, but then his secretary sees David using McKittrick's computer to talk to WOPR, as Joshua, and learning of an "alternate" site in Oregon. David is taken and put into confinement in a room in the medical area.

David finds a doctor's dictation device, jump connects it to the door controls, then fakes the guard by saying he needs to go to the bathroom, and records the DTMF-type sounds that unlock the door, and then admits he doesn't need to go. The guard closes the door again. David plays back the tape and unlocks the door, then sneaks out while the guard's attention is on a woman in the room, leaving the door jammed so it can't be opened with the code sequence. David crawls through air ducts while the FBI arrives and the guard can't open the door. David escapes NORAD in a tour group, then hitches a ride on a truck.

After getting some distance away, he calls Jennifer to buy him a plane ticket, and she joins him to fly to Oregon where they look for Professor Falken. Falken tries to persuade them that a nuclear holocaust is now inevitable, and says they can spend the night since they missed the last ferry, but David and Jennifer leave the house. Unknown to them, they've finally convinced Falken to help them, and he flies a helicopter which they think are the authorities trying to catch them; in fact Falken is merely offering them a ride. They hurry to Colorado and are riding a jeep in a frantic race as the facility closes up in preparation for war. They arrive just in time to take part in efforts to convince Joshua not to finish the Global Thermonuclear War game. Upon their arrival, Berringer has sent US Air Force bombers to the fail-safe line to proceed to Soviet targets should Joshua be successful in launching the US ICBM's.

Falken and David try to get into WOPR, but they're locked out each time they try to tell it to stop the game. They get in again and try to play tic-tac-toe, but it's slow with one player against the computer. They restart with zero players, and Joshua quickly learns the futility of that even as it's trying to unlock the launch codes. Joshua succeeds in deciphering the launch codes, and starts running simulations for a successful attack:

US first strike. Winner: none.
Soviet first strike. Winner: none.
China first strike. Winner: none.
China-US versus Soviet. Winner: none.
China-Soviet versus US. Winner: none.
India (Soviet ally) vs Pakistan (US ally). Winner: none.
Israel vs an Arab state. Winner: none.
Dozens, perhaps hundreds, of such scenarios are run, involving some of the smallest pairs of belligerent possibilities. Each one ends the same way - the major powers go to the aid of their small allies, and the two superpowers attack each other. Each one ends with no winner. The simulations run faster and faster. In the end, it appears that they have managed to teach WOPR/Joshua about the futility of war by getting it to play first those endless drawn games of tic-tac-toe against itself, then the simulations cycle through all the nuclear war strategies that WOPR has devised. WOPR/Joshua then learns that "the only winning move is not to play."



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Sirius

Posts: 1,723 Member Since:03/13/04

#75 [url]

May 30 06 2:07 PM

Noam Chomsky: Why it's over for America

An inability to protect its citizens. The belief that it is above the law. A lack of democracy. Three defining characteristics of the 'failed state'. And that, says Noam Chomsky, is exactly what the US is becoming. In an exclusive extract from his devastating new book, America's leading thinker explains how his country lost its way

Published: 30 May 2006

The selection of issues that should rank high on the agenda of concern for human welfare and rights is, naturally, a subjective matter. But there are a few choices that seem unavoidable, because they bear so directly on the prospects for decent survival. Among them are at least these three: nuclear war, environmental disaster, and the fact that the government of the world's leading power is acting in ways that increase the likelihood of these catastrophes. It is important to stress the government, because the population, not surprisingly, does not agree.

That brings up a fourth issue that should deeply concern Americans, and the world: the sharp divide between public opinion and public policy, one of the reasons for the fear, which cannot casually be put aside, that, as Gar Alperowitz puts it in America Beyond Capitalism, "the American 'system' as a whole is in real trouble - that it is heading in a direction that spells the end of its historic values [of] equality, liberty, and meaningful democracy".

The "system" is coming to have some of the features of failed states, to adopt a currently fashionable notion that is conventionally applied to states regarded as potential threats to our security (like Iraq) or as needing our intervention to rescue the population from severe internal threats (like Haiti). Though the concept is recognised to be, according to the journal Foreign Affairs, "frustratingly imprecise", some of the primary characteristics of failed states can be identified. One is their inability or unwillingness to protect their citizens from violence and perhaps even destruction. Another is their tendency to regard themselves as beyond the reach of domestic or international law, and hence free to carry out aggression and violence. And if they have democratic forms, they suffer from a serious "democratic deficit" that deprives their formal democratic institutions of real substance.

Among the hardest tasks that anyone can undertake, and one of the most important, is to look honestly in the mirror. If we allow ourselves to do so, we should have little difficulty in finding the characteristics of "failed states" right at home.

No one familiar with history should be surprised that the growing democratic deficit in the United States is accompanied by declaration of messianic missions to bring democracy to a suffering world. Declarations of noble intent by systems of power are rarely complete fabrication, and the same is true in this case. Under some conditions, forms of democracy are indeed acceptable. Abroad, as the leading scholar-advocate of "democracy promotion" concludes, we find a "strong line of continuity": democracy is acceptable if and only if it is consistent with strategic and economic interests (Thomas Carothers). In modified form, the doctrine holds at home as well.

The basic dilemma facing policymakers is sometimes candidly recognised at the dovish liberal extreme of the spectrum, for example, by Robert Pastor, President Carter's national security adviser for Latin America. He explained why the administration had to support the murderous and corrupt Somoza regime in Nicaragua, and, when that proved impossible, to try at least to maintain the US-trained National Guard even as it was massacring the population "with a brutality a nation usually reserves for its enemy", killing some 40,000 people. The reason was the familiar one: "The United States did not want to control Nicaragua or the other nations of the region, but it also did not want developments to get out of control. It wanted Nicaraguans to act independently, except when doing so would affect US interests adversely."

Similar dilemmas faced Bush administration planners after their invasion of Iraq. They want Iraqis "to act independently, except when doing so would affect US interests adversely". Iraq must therefore be sovereign and democratic, but within limits. It must somehow be constructed as an obedient client state, much in the manner of the traditional order in Central America. At a general level, the pattern is familiar, reaching to the opposite extreme of institutional structures. The Kremlin was able to maintain satellites that were run by domestic political and military forces, with the iron fist poised. Germany was able to do much the same in occupied Europe even while it was at war, as did fascist Japan in Man-churia (its Manchukuo). Fascist Italy achieved similar results in North Africa while carrying out virtual genocide that in no way harmed its favourable image in the West and possibly inspired Hitler. Traditional imperial and neocolonial systems illustrate many variations on similar themes.

To achieve the traditional goals in Iraq has proven to be surprisingly difficult, despite unusually favourable circumstances. The dilemma of combining a measure of independence with firm control arose in a stark form not long after the invasion, as mass non-violent resistance compelled the invaders to accept far more Iraqi initiative than they had anticipated. The outcome even evoked the nightmarish prospect of a more or less democratic and sovereign Iraq taking its place in a loose Shiite alliance comprising Iran, Shiite Iraq, and possibly the nearby Shiite-dominated regions of Saudi Arabia, controlling most of the world's oil and independent of Washington.

The situation could get worse. Iran might give up on hopes that Europe could become independent of the United States, and turn eastward. Highly relevant background is discussed by Selig Harrison, a leading specialist on these topics. "The nuclear negotiations between Iran and the European Union were based on a bargain that the EU, held back by the US, has failed to honour," Harrison observes.

"The bargain was that Iran would suspend uranium enrichment, and the EU would undertake security guarantees. The language of the joint declaration was "unambiguous. 'A mutually acceptable agreement,' it said, would not only provide 'objective guarantees' that Iran's nuclear programme is 'exclusively for peaceful purposes' but would 'equally provide firm commitments on security issues.'"

The phrase "security issues" is a thinly veiled reference to the threats by the United States and Israel to bomb Iran, and preparations to do so. The model regularly adduced is Israel's bombing of Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981, which appears to have initiated Saddam's nuclear weapons programs, another demonstration that violence tends to elicit violence. Any attempt to execute similar plans against Iran could lead to immediate violence, as is surely understood in Washington. During a visit to Tehran, the influential Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr warned that his militia would defend Iran in the case of any attack, "one of the strongest signs yet", the Washington Post reported, "that Iraq could become a battleground in any Western conflict with Iran, raising the spectre of Iraqi Shiite militias - or perhaps even the US-trained Shiite-dominated military - taking on American troops here in sympathy with Iran." The Sadrist bloc, which registered substantial gains in the December 2005 elections, may soon become the most powerful single political force in Iraq. It is consciously pursuing the model of other successful Islamist groups, such as Hamas in Palestine, combining strong resistance to military occupation with grassroots social organising and service to the poor.

Washington's unwillingness to allow regional security issues to be considered is nothing new. It has also arisen repeatedly in the confrontation with Iraq. In the background is the matter of Israeli nuclear weapons, a topic that Washington bars from international consideration. Beyond that lurks what Harrison rightly describes as "the central problem facing the global non-proliferation regime": the failure of the nuclear states to live up to their nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligation "to phase out their own nuclear weapons" - and, in Washington's case, formal rejection of the obligation.

Unlike Europe, China refuses to be intimidated by Washington, a primary reason for the growing fear of China on the part of US planners. Much of Iran's oil already goes to China, and China is providing Iran with weapons, presumably considered a deterrent to US threats. Still more uncomfortable for Washington is the fact that, according to the Financial Times, "the Sino-Saudi relationship has developed dramatically", including Chinese military aid to Saudi Arabia and gas exploration rights for China. By 2005, Saudi Arabia provided about 17 per cent of China's oil imports. Chinese and Saudi oil companies have signed deals for drilling and construction of a huge refinery (with Exxon Mobil as a partner). A January 2006 visit by Saudi king Abdullah to Beijing was expected to lead to a Sino-Saudi memorandum of understanding calling for "increased cooperation and investment between the two countries in oil, natural gas, and minerals".

Indian analyst Aijaz Ahmad observes that Iran could "emerge as the virtual linchpin in the making, over the next decade or so, of what China and Russia have come to regard as an absolutely indispensable Asian Energy Security Grid, for breaking Western control of the world's energy supplies and securing the great industrial revolution of Asia". South Korea and southeast Asian countries are likely to join, possibly Japan as well. A crucial question is how India will react. It rejected US pressures to withdraw from an oil pipeline deal with Iran. On the other hand, India joined the United States and the EU in voting for an anti-Iranian resolution at the IAEA, joining also in their hypocrisy, since India rejects the NPT regime to which Iran, so far, appears to be largely conforming. Ahmad reports that India may have secretly reversed its stand under Iranian threats to terminate a $20bn gas deal. Washington later warned India that its "nuclear deal with the US could be ditched" if India did not go along with US demands, eliciting a sharp rejoinder from the Indian foreign ministry and an evasive tempering of the warning by the US embassy.

The prospect that Europe and Asia might move toward greater independence has seriously troubled US planners since World War II, and concerns have significantly increased as the tripolar order has continued to evolve, along with new south-south interactions and rapidly growing EU engagement with China.

US intelligence has projected that the United States, while controlling Middle East oil for the traditional reasons, will itself rely mainly on more stable Atlantic Basin resources (West Africa, western hemisphere). Control of Middle East oil is now far from a sure thing, and these expectations are also threatened by developments in the western hemisphere, accelerated by Bush administration policies that have left the United States remarkably isolated in the global arena. The Bush administration has even succeeded in alienating Canada, an impressive feat.

Canada's minister of natural resources said that within a few years one quarter of the oil that Canada now sends to the United States may go to China instead. In a further blow to Washington's energy policies, the leading oil exporter in the hemisphere, Venezuela, has forged probably the closest relations with China of any Latin American country, and is planning to sell increasing amounts of oil to China as part of its effort to reduce dependence on the openly hostile US government. Latin America as a whole is increasing trade and other relations with China, with some setbacks, but likely expansion, in particular for raw materials exporters like Brazil and Chile.

Meanwhile, Cuba-Venezuela relations are becoming very close, each relying on its comparative advantage. Venezuela is providing low-cost oil while in return Cuba organises literacy and health programs, sending thousands of highly skilled professionals, teachers, and doctors, who work in the poorest and most neglected areas, as they do elsewhere in the Third World. Cuba-Venezuela projects are extending to the Caribbean countries, where Cuban doctors are providing healthcare to thousands of people with Venezuelan funding. Operation Miracle, as it is called, is described by Jamaica's ambassador to Cuba as "an example of integration and south-south cooperation", and is generating great enthusiasm among the poor majority. Cuban medical assistance is also being welcomed elsewhere. One of the most horrendous tragedies of recent years was the October 2005 earthquake in Pakistan. In addition to the huge toll, unknown numbers of survivors have to face brutal winter weather with little shelter, food, or medical assistance. One has to turn to the South Asian press to read that "Cuba has provided the largest contingent of doctors and paramedics to Pakistan", paying all the costs (perhaps with Venezuelan funding), and that President Musharraf expressed his "deep gratitude" for the "spirit and compassion" of the Cuban medical teams.

(continuarà...)

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Sirius

Posts: 1,723 Member Since:03/13/04

#76 [url]

May 30 06 2:08 PM

continua....

Some analysts have suggested that Cuba and Venezuela might even unite, a step towards further integration of Latin America in a bloc that is more independent from the United States. Venezuela has joined Mercosur, the South American customs union, a move described by Argentine president Nestor Kirchner as "a milestone" in the development of this trading bloc, and welcomed as opening "a new chapter in our integration" by Brazilian president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. Independent experts say that "adding Venezuela to the bloc furthers its geopolitical vision of eventually spreading Mercosur to the rest of the region".

At a meeting to mark Venezuela's entry into Mercosur, Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez said, "We cannot allow this to be purely an economic project, one for the elites and for the transnational companies," a not very oblique reference to the US-sponsored "Free Trade Agreement for the Americas", which has aroused strong public opposition. Venezuela also supplied Argentina with fuel oil to help stave off an energy crisis, and bought almost a third of Argentine debt issued in 2005, one element of a region-wide effort to free the countries from the control of the US-dominated IMF after two decades of disastrous effects of conformity to its rules. The IMF has "acted towards our country as a promoter and a vehicle of policies that caused poverty and pain among the Argentine people", President Kirchner said in announcing his decision to pay almost $1 trillion to rid itself of the IMF forever. Radically violating IMF rules, Argentina enjoyed a substantial recovery from the disaster left by IMF policies.

Steps toward independent regional integration advanced further with the election of Evo Morales in Bolivia in December 2005, the first president from the indigenous majority. Morales moved quickly to reach energy accords with Venezuela.

Though Central America was largely disciplined by Reaganite violence and terror, the rest of the hemisphere is falling out of control, particularly from Venezuela to Argentina, which was the poster child of the IMF and the Treasury Department until its economy collapsed under the policies they imposed. Much of the region has left-centre governments. The indigenous populations have become much more active and influential, particularly in Bolivia and Ecuador, both major energy producers, where they either want oil and gas to be domestically controlled or, in some cases, oppose production altogether. Many indigenous people apparently do not see any reason why their lives, societies, and cultures should be disrupted or destroyed so that New Yorkers can sit in SUVs in traffic gridlock. Some are even calling for an "Indian nation" in South America. Meanwhile the economic integration that is under way is reversing patterns that trace back to the Spanish conquests, with Latin American elites and economies linked to the imperial powers but not to one another. Along with growing south-south interaction on a broader scale, these developments are strongly influenced by popular organisations that are coming together in the unprecedented international global justice movements, ludicrously called "anti-globalisation" because they favour globalisation that privileges the interests of people, not investors and financial institutions. For many reasons, the system of US global dominance is fragile, even apart from the damage inflicted by Bush planners.

One consequence is that the Bush administration's pursuit of the traditional policies of deterring democracy faces new obstacles. It is no longer as easy as before to resort to military coups and international terrorism to overthrow democratically elected governments, as Bush planners learnt ruefully in 2002 in Venezuela. The "strong line of continuity" must be pursued in other ways, for the most part. In Iraq, as we have seen, mass nonviolent resistance compelled Washington and London to permit the elections they had sought to evade. The subsequent effort to subvert the elections by providing substantial advantages to the administration's favourite candidate, and expelling the independent media, also failed. Washington faces further problems. The Iraqi labor movement is making considerable progress despite the opposition of the occupation authorities. The situation is rather like Europe and Japan after World War II, when a primary goal of the United States and United Kingdom was to undermine independent labour movements - as at home, for similar reasons: organised labour contributes in essential ways to functioning democracy with popular engagement. Many of the measures adopted at that time - withholding food, supporting fascist police - are no longer available. Nor is it possible today to rely on the labour bureaucracy of the American Institute for Free Labor Development to help undermine unions. Today, some American unions are supporting Iraqi workers, just as they do in Colombia, where more union activists are murdered than anywhere in the world. At least the unions now receive support from the United Steelworkers of America and others, while Washington continues to provide enormous funding for the government, which bears a large part of the responsibility.

The problem of elections arose in Palestine much in the way it did in Iraq. As already discussed, the Bush administration refused to permit elections until the death of Yasser Arafat, aware that the wrong man would win. After his death, the administration agreed to permit elections, expecting the victory of its favoured Palestinian Authority candidates. To promote this outcome, Washington resorted to much the same modes of subversion as in Iraq, and often before. Washington used the US Agency for International Development as an "invisible conduit" in an effort to "increase the popularity of the Palestinian Authority on the eve of crucial elections in which the governing party faces a serious challenge from the radical Islamic group Hamas" (Washington Post), spending almost $2m "on dozens of quick projects before elections this week to bolster the governing Fatah faction's image with voters" (New York Times). In the United States, or any Western country, even a hint of such foreign interference would destroy a candidate, but deeply rooted imperial mentality legitimates such routine measures elsewhere. However, the attempt to subvert the elections again resoundingly failed.

The US and Israeli governments now have to adjust to dealing somehow with a radical Islamic party that approaches their traditional rejectionist stance, though not entirely, at least if Hamas really does mean to agree to an indefinite truce on the international border as its leaders state. The US and Israel, in contrast, insist that Israel must take over substantial parts of the West Bank (and the forgotten Golan Heights). Hamas's refusal to accept Israel's "right to exist" mirrors the refusal of Washington and Jerusalem to accept Palestine's "right to exist" - a concept unknown in international affairs; Mexico accepts the existence of the United States but not its abstract "right to exist" on almost half of Mexico, acquired by conquest. Hamas's formal commitment to "destroy Israel" places it on a par with the United States and Israel, which vowed formally that there could be no "additional Palestinian state" (in addition to Jordan) until they relaxed their extreme rejectionist stand partially in the past few years, in the manner already reviewed. Although Hamas has not said so, it would come as no great surprise if Hamas were to agree that Jews may remain in scattered areas in the present Israel, while Palestine constructs huge settlement and infrastructure projects to take over the valuable land and resources, effectively breaking Israel up into unviable cantons, virtually separated from one another and from some small part of Jerusalem where Jews would also be allowed to remain. And they might agree to call the fragments "a state". If such proposals were made, we would - rightly - regard them as virtually a reversion to Nazism, a fact that might elicit some thoughts. If such proposals were made, Hamas's position would be essentially like that of the United States and Israel for the past five years, after they came to tolerate some impoverished form of "statehood". It is fair to describe Hamas as radical, extremist, and violent, and as a serious threat to peace and a just political settlement. But the organisation is hardly alone in this stance.

Elsewhere traditional means of undermining democracy have succeeded. In Haiti, the Bush administration's favourite "democracy-building group, the International Republican Institute", worked assiduously to promote the opposition to President Aristide, helped by the withholding of desperately needed aid on grounds that were dubious at best. When it seemed that Aristide would probably win any genuine election, Washington and the opposition chose to withdraw, a standard device to discredit elections that are going to come out the wrong way: Nicaragua in 1984 and Venezuela in December 2005 are examples that should be familiar. Then followed a military coup, expulsion of the president, and a reign of terror and violence vastly exceeding anything under the elected government.

The persistence of the strong line of continuity to the present again reveals that the United States is very much like other powerful states. It pursues the strategic and economic interests of dominant sectors of the domestic population, to the accompaniment of rhetorical flourishes about its dedication to the highest values. That is practically a historical universal, and the reason why sensible people pay scant attention to declarations of noble intent by leaders, or accolades by their followers.

One commonly hears that carping critics complain about what is wrong, but do not present solutions. There is an accurate translation for that charge: "They present solutions, but I don't like them." In addition to the proposals that should be familiar about dealing with the crises that reach to the level of survival, a few simple suggestions for the United States have already been mentioned: 1) accept the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and the World Court; 2) sign and carry forward the Kyoto protocols; 3) let the UN take the lead in international crises; 4) rely on diplomatic and economic measures rather than military ones in confronting terror; 5) keep to the traditional interpretation of the UN Charter; 6) give up the Security Council veto and have "a decent respect for the opinion of mankind," as the Declaration of Independence advises, even if power centres disagree; 7) cut back sharply on military spending and sharply increase social spending. For people who believe in democracy, these are very conservative suggestions: they appear to be the opinions of the majority of the US population, in most cases the overwhelming majority. They are in radical opposition to public policy. To be sure, we cannot be very confident about the state of public opinion on such matters because of another feature of the democratic deficit: the topics scarcely enter into public discussion and the basic facts are little known. In a highly atomised society, the public is therefore largely deprived of the opportunity to form considered opinions.

Another conservative suggestion is that facts, logic, and elementary moral principles should matter. Those who take the trouble to adhere to that suggestion will soon be led to abandon a good part of familiar doctrine, though it is surely much easier to repeat self-serving mantras. Such simple truths carry us some distance toward developing more specific and detailed answers. More important, they open the way to implement them, opportun- ities that are readily within our grasp if we can free ourselves from the shackles of doctrine and imposed illusion.

Though it is natural for doctrinal systems to seek to induce pessimism, hopelessness, and despair, reality is different. There has been substantial progress in the unending quest for justice and freedom in recent years, leaving a legacy that can be carried forward from a higher plane than before. Opportunities for education and organising abound. As in the past, rights are not likely to be granted by benevolent authorities, or won by intermittent actions - attending a few demonstrations or pushing a lever in the personalised quadrennial extravaganzas that are depicted as "democratic politics". As always in the past, the tasks require dedicated day-by-day engagement to create - in part recreate - the basis for a functioning democratic culture in which the public plays some role in determining policies, not only in the political arena, from which it is largely excluded, but also in the crucial economic arena, from which it is excluded in principle. There are many ways to promote democracy at home, carrying it to new dimensions. Opportunities are ample, and failure to grasp them is likely to have ominous repercussions: for the country, for the world, and for future generations.

This is an edited extract from Failed States by Noam Chomsky (Hamish Hamilton), £16.99. To buy it for £15.50 (inc p&p), call Independent Books Direct on 0870 079 8897

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Mariana Guerra

Posts: 2,179 Member Since:01/08/05

#78 [url]

May 30 06 6:51 PM

Muy interesantes tus no comentarios chal...
¿Eso no se llama spam?

Vas que vuelas para profesional del spam...

¿Sabes si eso se reporta en el foro?

“A todos nos gusta mandar y ser obedecidos, ¿a poco no? A todos nos gusta tener mucho dinero y a todos nos gusta el placer.” Felipe Calderón Hinojosa.- Puebla, 27 de abril de 1995.

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elshah

Posts: 1,343 Member Since:12/09/05

#79 [url]

May 30 06 7:25 PM

La Poquianchi Mareadita dijo:

QUOTE
Muy interesantes tus no comentarios chal...
¿Eso no se llama spam?

Vas que vuelas para profesional del spam...

¿Sabes si eso se reporta en el foro?


Ya llego la chismosa de la ventana. ¿No decias en otros temas que al que no le interese una opinion bien la puede pasar por alto? ¿Y los interminables pegostes de Cirio Peraloca no son una forma de spam? ¿Porque no vas de chilletas con los administradores del foro con ese tipo de spam? Namas te gusta estar de ladilla con los foristas con los que no concuerdas.

Para ti, nadamas queda este remedio:

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Mariana Guerra

Posts: 2,179 Member Since:01/08/05

#80 [url]

May 30 06 7:28 PM

No seas menso... se llama marcaje personal.

elcadillo/rofl.gif

ardido.

“A todos nos gusta mandar y ser obedecidos, ¿a poco no? A todos nos gusta tener mucho dinero y a todos nos gusta el placer.” Felipe Calderón Hinojosa.- Puebla, 27 de abril de 1995.

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